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Environmental Justice: Where are the Fracking Sites?
Elizabeth Adams
Abstract
This paper looks at the variables that determine the location of hydraulic fracturing
wells. Using cross-sectional data on Texas counties, we test whether county
income level and the percentage of the population that is minority are significant
indicators of well location. This study mirrors other studies that focus on the
location of undesirable land uses such as landfills. Our study finds that income
level and the size of the minority population are not statistically significant
indicators of hydraulic fracturing well location.
I. Introduction
The method of hydraulic fracturing used in the oil and gas industry has
been utilized for many years. More recently in the natural gas industry, the method
of hydraulic fracturing, commonly known as fracking, has been combined with
horizontal drilling in order to access more gas from each well. The well not only
extends vertically into the deep shale basins, but also horizontally from the kickoff
point up to 10,500 feet outwards (Hydraulic Fracturing). This new technique as
well as the discovery of Marcellus shale along the east coast has brought fracking
to the attention of the public at large. The potential environmental and health
impacts of fracking wells on the surrounding area will be discussed later in the
paper and are widely debated. The question of interest for this paper, however, is
how great is the impact of local income levels and other demographic measures
as indicators of where natural gas wells are located.
The question this paper focuses on is interesting because it investigates
one example of externalities resulting from natural resource extraction. The
difficulty of these externalities is balancing the need for the service with the
unaccounted for cost of accessing it. To explore this a bit further, consider that
natural gas could be the solution to the United States’ dependence on foreign oil
because the country has many large shale deposits, the rock formation that holds
5

the natural gas. Natural gas would also boost the economy as a new area of
development. It burns cleaner than other widely used fossil fuels so it could help
solve problems with greenhouse gas emissions. The downside of this venture
is the externalities that come from drilling natural gas wells. Research is just
beginning to emerge on the health impacts of hydraulic fracturing wells for people
and the environment. This makes it difficult to form a strong argument for the
existence of this particular negative externality. Instead, this paper will simply
look at where these wells are being located.
The initial motivation for this paper is the current debate on Marcellus
shale. Watching the documentary Gasland serves as further inspiration because
the families that seem to be dealing with the problems associated with natural
gas wells appear to have lower incomes. The idea for the model used in this
paper is inspired by the models set up by Boer et al. and Pastor et al. These
two articles investigate the claims of environmental racism with regard to the
location of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDF). The research in
this paper applies a similar model to the location of natural gas wells, which will
be discussed further in the literature review section. Texas counties are the focus
of this analysis because data is most easily accessible for this area on all of the
variables included in the model.
Assuming that there is some negative externality from natural gas wells,
whether it is the loss in land aesthetics or water contamination, our interest is in
the equality of the distribution of this externality. Economists are interested in the
location of sites that result in some negative externality, such as hazardous waste
facilities and landfills, to see whether they are disproportionately located near a
certain portion of the population. This new area of interest has culminated as the
environmental justice movement. Environmental justice “is the principle that all
people and communities are entitled to equal protection of environmental and
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public health laws and regulations” (Brulle 2006). Is there environmental justice
in the location of natural gas wells? Similar questions have been asked by other
researchers but we have not found another paper on the application to the natural
gas industry.
There are three economic theories that have been developed that
pertain to the issues highlighted by the environmental justice movement:
discrimination, the Coase theorem, and the theory of collective action (Hamilton
1993). Discrimination and the theory of collective action are the main points
made by researchers in support of the environmental justice movement. The
results of Hamilton’s study indicate “that firms processing hazardous waste, when
deciding where to expand capacity, do take into account variations in the potential
for collective action to raise their costs” (Hamilton 1993). This is just one
specific, illustrative example of the theory of collective action. Discrimination
is very similar to this but references specific demographic characteristics as the
distinguishing factor in firms’ decision-making with respect to the location of
undesirable land uses.
The Coase theorem alternatively states that “even in the presence of
externalities an economy can always reach an efficient solution provided that the
costs of making a deal are sufficiently low” (Krugman et al. 2007). Applying this
to the location of fracking wells, a well should be located where the benefit from
the wells exceeds the costs. One can argue this theory does not hold true because
the health impact of the drilling exceeds the benefits to the economy. This is
an especially poignant argument today with the recent statement released by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA stated, in response to water
contamination complaints from the community of Pavillion, Wyoming, that “the
explanation best fitting the data…is that constituents associated with hydraulic
fracturing have been released into the Wind River drinking water aquifer” (Llanos
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2011). In the past, EPA studies have supported the findings of the natural gas
companies that fracking does not cause water contamination. New findings may
change the current leniency the natural gas industry benefits from.
Before we discuss the empirical analysis behind the paper further, it
is first important to understand some of the politics behind the controversy of
hydraulic fracturing wells. The main point that will be addressed here is the
exemptions from federal regulations that the natural gas industry has accumulated.
The most notable exemptions are from the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts as
of 1990 and 1987 respectively (New York Times). In 2005, Congress exempted
natural gas drillers from having to provide detailed reports on the potential
environmental impact of some of their activities, thus exempting them from the
National Environmental Policy Act (New York Times). Again in 2005, after an
EPA study was challenged by one of its own members saying that the study’s
conclusions were unsupported and that some members of the study’s peer review
panel had conflicts of interest, Congress still exempted hydraulic fracturing from
the Safe Drinking Water Act (New York Times). Other exemptions for hydraulic
fracturing include from the Superfund Act in 1980, the Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act in 1986, and exemption from the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act in 1988 (New York Times). This relatively large
list of government approved exemptions from regulations that ultimately protect
Americans’ health adds to our interest in the environmental justice claims that will
be investigated in this paper.
II. Literature Review
Our interest in the topic was partially inspired by such articles as “The
Gas Dilemma,” written by Bryan Walsh of Time Magazine that begins by noting
that the great energy potential of natural gas comes with “the catch” that it could
come with significant environmental and social costs. The environmental justice
8

movement is interested in such situations as the equal distribution of these costs
across society. The movement has in recent times been gaining attention from
more and more academic literature. The goal of much of this literature is to
determine whether or not demographic inequalities characterize the location of
sites that pose some risk to the surrounding population. Boer et al. considers
the location of TSDF. Other authors have studied the location of other “locally
undesirable land uses” such as landfills (Been 1993). One of these land uses
that has not be researched in depth is the location of hydraulic fracturing wells.
This paper adapts the methods used by other researchers on environmental justice
issues to see if the locations of these wells are characterized by demographic
inequalities.
The known impacts of hydraulic fracturing wells are habitat fragmentation
and the risk of a fluid spill. Hazardous chemicals are used in fracking to break
the shale. When the fluids come back up, they are moved to a membrane-lined
storage pad to dry out so the water from the mixture can evaporate. If the pad
tears or there are heavy rains during this process, these pads can develop leaks or
overflow. A controversial hazard of fracking wells is the potential contamination
of groundwater and more specifically residential wells. This would be caused
by the release of Normally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM). When the
shale is broken, NORMs can leak up through the ground along with some of
the fracking fluids. With these risks in mind, we continue our review of related
studies to see how their methods can be applied to this new land use.
The econometric model used in this paper utilizes variables relevant
to this study from previous literature that also evaluates environmental justice
claims. In many of the other studies there are measures of the presence of an
undesirable land use such as TSDF. This study uses a measure of the number of
wells in a county as the dependent variable (Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997).
9

In similar studies there are usually independent variables that account for logical
reasons for the location of such a facility such as community waste generation
or the cost of locating in an area (Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997). The study
presented in this paper similarly uses average land value to account for the cost of
locating a well in a specific area.
In the study done by Boer et al., the authors found both median household
income and per capita income to have statistically significant coefficients so this
study uses median household income because it is less influenced by outliers
(Hamilton 1993, Boer et al. 1997). The final major influence you will see in this
paper from previous literature is the use of simultaneous equations. The use of
this type of model is consistent with the article written by Pastor et al., which
investigates the disproportionate siting and minority move-in hypotheses. This
brief overview justifies the modeling techniques used here because it shows that
while this study explores a different issues, its structure is based on previously
peer-reviewed work.
III. Modeling
The basis of the model in this paper is the question of whether or not
local income levels and other demographics can indicate to a certain extent
where natural gas wells are located. There is evidence both for and against
the hypothesis that these factors do impact well location. One specific claim
related to the environmental justice argument is that firms consider the potential
for communities to mobilize and engage in collective action in deciding where
to locate locally undesirable land uses (Hamilton 1993). Hamilton finds that
commercial hazardous waste firms did take this factor into account in deciding
where to add capacity during the period 1987-1992. His explanation of this result
is that “the differing degree to which groups organize to demand compensation
and raise a firm’s costs of choosing a particular location drives a wedge between
10

the social costs of its externalities and the costs voiced through the political
process of its site selection” and therefore challenges the outcome of the Coase
theorem (Hamilton 1993). The location where the potential for collective action
is the least may not be where the damage of its externalities is the least (Hamilton
1993). This is just one piece of evidence from past research that suggests that
demographic characteristics that stereotypically suggest less potential for
collective action significantly impact the location of facilities that bring with it
negative externalities born by the surrounding community.
Other potential evidence that would support our hypothesis would be
if the coefficients on the income and/or the minority population variables are
statistically significant in difference from 0 given our data on fracking wells
and demographics of counties in Texas. Contradicting evidence would be if the
coefficients on the previous variables were not statistically significant yet the
coefficients on the control variables were. To test to see what evidence can be
gathered from this analysis we first used the following model:

The hypothesis is that the income and minority population variables do significantly
impact the number of wells within a county. These two variables are the focus of
this research. The control variables include a proxy variable for the presence of
natural gas (Resource), population size (Population), and the land area of a county
(Land). Hamilton’s paper illustrates the reason why the theory holds that these
two variables may be significant, because stereotypically both low income and
minority communities are seen as having less collective action potential against
such issues as fracking well location. Resource accounts for the fact that firms
will build wells where there is natural gas to extract. Population and Land are
included because they are control variables included in other comparable models
and they account for the fact that the less land there is open, the fewer wells that
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can be built due to the space required for the construction. According to the
Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, each natural
gas well site requires between 3 to 5 acres when fully constructed.
The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is first used to estimate the
coefficients of the multivariable regression but the initial model is not correctly
specified. We find that our initial model has simultaneity bias and correct for this
by using the two-stage lease squares (2SLS) method. Additional variables are
included after further research. The final model we work with is a simultaneous
equations model where Wells and Income are endogenous variables and Resource,
PopDensity, Minority, Value1997, and Education are exogenous variables. The
simultaneous equations that will be estimated are as follows:

Opponents to environmental justice claims argue that firms’ do not choose to
locate an undesirable land use in low income communities. They argue that the
location of the site is due to the cost of land because land costs are usually lower
in low income communities or that low income households often relocate near
these sites because land costs decrease. We do not have panel data to account for
simultaneous changes in number of wells and land value. Instead, we use county
income level as the instrumental variable. This study therefore cannot imply
anything about the firms’ or the communities’ decision making. It is assumed
that county demographics before the more widespread construction of natural
gas wells are determined by the exogenous variable for 1997 land value. It is
also assumed that this land value is equivalent to the price natural gas companies
would have to pay in order to locate a well there. Given these two assumptions,
we can then account for the significance of demographic characteristics and the
included control variables on the number of wells in a county. The hypothesis
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is that county income levels do have a significant impact on the number of
wells located in the county, holding constant the impact of all other explanatory
variables. This hypothesis would support environmental justice claims. We
continue with a more in depth description of the data used in this analysis before
examining the regression results.
IV. Data
The ideal data set would be a panel data set including data on all counties
in the United States for a number of time periods. The data would include
measures of the number of wells built during each time period, the amount of
accessible shale within each county, population density, the average value of
land, the percentage of the population with a college degree, the percentage of the
county population that is minority, and the median income of each county for each
specified time period. Acquiring this data would allow the study to better analyze
the firms’ decisions on locating natural gas wells. By lagging some variables such
as income, the number of wells built in the next time period would presumably
reflect data the decision maker would have from the previous period. With this
data, the impact of demographics such as income level and minority could be
better isolated from the impact of land value on firms’ decision-making. Due to
time restrictions and data availability, cross-sectional data is used over all counties
in Texas, a state with a large presence of the natural gas industry.
A sample of all Texas counties that had appropriate data was included in
this model. This sample of 233 counties only excluded 21 counties due to missing
data. The variables included in the final regression model are Wells, Resource,
PopDensity, Minority, Value1997, Income, and Education. Table 1 includes
descriptions of these variables and lists their sources and Figure 1 provides the
basic statistics on each variable.
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Table 1
Variable
Wells
Resource
PopDensity
Minority
Value1997
Income
Education

Source

Description
Number of regular producing gas wells as of
September 2010

Railroad Commission
of Texas

Gas wells gas production in thousands of cubic
feet; measured from January to December 2010

Railroad Commission
of Texas

Persons per square mile, 2010

US Census Bureau

2010 minority population as percentage of total
population

US Census Bureau

1997 average county market value of acre of land

Texas A&M Institute
of Renewable Natural
Resources

2009 Median household income

US Census Bureau

2005-2009 percentage of population age 25+ with
bachelor’s degree or higher

US Census Bureau

Figure1
.
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Note that Wells, Income, and Resource have the largest standard deviations
suggesting that these variables vary most about their mean relative to other
included variables. Our empirical analysis may find that the variation in Wells is
best explained by the variation of Income and/or Resource. These observations
are purely speculative.
V. Evidence
As mentioned before, the analysis began with a multiple regression
model that was estimated using OLS. This model was first estimated using a
random sample of 30 counties in Texas. After the data on all counties in Texas
were collected, the regression model was run again with the same specification.
Using the Ramsey RESET test, we found that the old model specification no
longer fit the data. With both regressions there were heteroscedasticity problems,
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which were corrected for by using robust standard errors. The results of these
initial regressions are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Variables

N=30
P-values

N=30
Coefficients

N=233
P-values

N=233
Coefficients

Resource

0.03

6.49*10-6

0.00

8.64*10-6

Population

0.27

-0.0026

0.07

-0.00039

Minority

0.06

2772.626

0.06

568.54

Income

0.12

0.0758

0.04

0.015

Land

0.28

0.2511

0.11

0.025

After attempting logical model specification changes using OLS regression
methods, the model was tested for simultaneity bias using the Hausman
Specification Test. In this process, we decided to include slightly different
variables reflecting further research. The test results, shown in Figure 2, indicate
that the model does have simultaneity bias because the Prob>F value (0.01) is less
than 0.05. In other words, the impact of the residuals from running a regression
of the reduced form equations is significant in difference from 0. This also means
that there is a feedback loop so to correct for this we construct the simultaneous
equations discussed above and estimate them using 2SLS. The regression results
are shown in Figure 3. Before interpreting the regression results, it is also
important to note that the 2SLS model was also tested to see if Income was a
strong instrumental variable. The Stata output from this test is shown in Figure 4.
The OLS regression of the instrumental variable Income on all included variables
and the identifying variable, Education, indicates that Income is a good instrument
because the Prob>F value (0.00) is less than the 0.05 level of significance so we
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can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all included variables are 0.
In other words, the Adjusted-R2 is statistically significant in difference from 0.
Figure 2
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The p-values for Resource (0.00), PopDensity (0.04), and Value1997
(0.00) indicate that we can reject the null hypotheses that the coefficients on
these variables are 0. In other words, their coefficient estimates are statistically
significant in difference from 0. The coefficients on these variables do all have the
expected sign. The coefficient on Resource is positive, which is logical because if
there is more natural gas in a county, there should be more wells to extract it. The
coefficients on PopDensity and Value1997 are not as expected. This possibly can
be explained by an unaccounted for model specification problem.
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Previous literature has found that there is a parabolic relationship
between the presence of an undesirable land use site and income. Boer et al.
found that “income has first a positive, then a negative effect on TSDF location,
a pattern that likely reflects the fact that the poorest communities have little
economic activity while wealthier communities have the economic and political
power to resist negative environmental externalities.” This finding may also
apply to PopDensity and Value1997. Very desolate areas where land is not
habitable may correspond with a type of land where shale deposits are also not
often found while very populated areas, where water and organic materials are
more abundant, are too populated for the construction of a natural gas well. This
example, purely speculative, describes a similar situation to that found by Boer
et al. A step for further research would be to include a squared term. A similar
example could be constructed for Value1997. This relationship is not accounted
for by the current model and could explain the unexpected sign of the coefficients.
The final observation from this regression analysis that is pertinent to our study
is that the sign of the coefficient on Income, although not significant in difference
from 0, has the hypothesized sign. The coefficient is negative suggesting that
if income increases, the number of wells in that county will decrease, holding
constant the impact of all other variables. The coefficient on Minority is also
negative, contrary to our hypothesis. The weaknesses of this study are the lack of
panel data and the model specification. Further research is needed on this issue
to gain better insight into the location of these wells as the natural gas industry
continues to grow.
VI. Conclusions
Although the model does not indicant that the impacts of income and
minority status on the number of wells in a county are significant, further research
is necessary to look at this relationship across time. We believe that analysis using
18

panel data may find different results or at least offer a more clear interpretation
and application of findings. This study suggests that income and the percentage
of the population that is a minority are not significant indicators of where natural
gas wells are located in Texas counties. These findings challenge claims made by
the environmental justice movement. This does not mean, however, that there is
any less of a need to do further research on the possible health and environmental
impacts of hydraulic fracturing. Further analytical research is needed in on the
issue of fracking well location that can address the issues of the best unit of
observation (county, census tract, borough, etc) that should be used in the analysis
and data limitations. Research is crucial for appropriate policy implementation
and public understanding especially as the natural gas industry expands.
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The Staffing of Presidential Assistants: Their Effect on
Presidential Success in the House of Representatives
Nicholas Jesteadt
Abstract
This paper examines the Congressional success of United States Presidents
based on the reported Congressional Quarterly Presidential Box Scores. Their
individual success is examined as an effect of the senior staff member a President
chooses and whether they are chosen from the campaign, personal experience,
or previous administrations. It is important for a President to consider the
origins of these staffers as these Assistants to the President act as the body of the
President’s administration. The econometric analysis presented reveals several
interesting results. First, the predominance of a President to choose staff members
from his campaign shows no significant impact on his Congressional relations
and success. Second, staff members chosen from personal experience have a
negatively correlated hindrance on success. Finally, those members chosen for
their experience in previous administrations has a positive impact on Presidential
success. This research is used to supplement the existing, qualitative research on
the subject through regression analysis.

I. Introduction
At the beginning of every new Presidential administration, during the
transition period, a President is faced with several critical choices, namely: what
staff he should pick as his Assistants to the President. Assistants to the President
are the senior staffers in the White House. They work with the President daily,
they have offices in the White House, and they prepare advice sheets and
recommendations for every policy that comes in the President’s door. He looks to
them for those recommendations. There are also several that work with Congress,
acting as a Liaison between the two and a defender of the President’s agenda. It
is critical that the President picks the right people for the jobs because they could
influence his success.
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What are the right people for the job? Who should the President hire
for those positions? The purpose of this paper is to determine if the types of staff
members a President picks as his Assistants influence his success and secondly,
what types of staff members provide a positive influence on that success.
This paper aims to provide insight to future Presidents as they choose
the people they want for the different Assistant positions. It also provides insight
to political pundits as they evaluate the likely success of a President over his
four or eight year term. Also, it provides a lens with which to evaluate the past
performances and staff choices of Presidents. The findings of this paper may also
be significant to gubernatorial success and local elections and perhaps even to
other global governments in its determination of ideal staff member backgrounds.
Previous literature has only just begun evaluating the factors that cause
political success. Bond and Fleischer (1990) and Covington, et al (1995) are just
a few of the papers that have begun exploring this topic. Their previous work
laid the foundation for this paper to explore the possibility of Assistants to the
President influencing presidential success, specifically in the legislative arena of
the House of Representatives.
In the next section, I will describe the previous literature on the topic,
including papers that postulated and laid the framework for my study but did
not provide any empirical background. Being that this is a novel study, I will
also describe similar studies in the field of presidential legislative success and
the variables they tested. In section three, I will present the entity-demeaned OLS
equation being used to model this data and will discuss the relevant variables. In
section four I will discuss and make observations about the data collected to test
my hypothesis, and in section five, I will perform an empirical analysis of my
hypothesis using the collected data to validate or negate previous literature that
based their conclusions on assumptions. Finally, I will conclude and summarize
my findings.
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II. Literature Review
This paper will attempt to add statistical evidence to the current theoretic
literature on the effect of a President’s senior staff on the success of the administration.
Most current papers on the topic are observational and base their conclusions on
several assumptions. They do not justify their conclusions with any concrete data. In
this paper, I will attempt to explain the success of a Presidential legislative success
with the type of senior staff members in the administration.
For example, Carey examines Presidential staffing in the sixties and
seventies and critiques the Johnson and Nixon administrations for their choices
in senior officials – namely assistants to the President (1969). They suggest that
more experienced staffers, who have engaged in the framework of staffing work,
will better aid the President in completing his work. Carey’s paper does not
specifically focus on Presidential “success” but he does comment on Presidential
“effectiveness” and “efficiency.” Again, this paper is merely critical commentary
and does not provide any statistical evidence.
Hoxie continued evaluating presidential staff choices for the Ford and
Carter administrations, concluding that a President should select as his aides, men
“whose goals and experience involve service to more than a single politician”
(1980). Hoxie also concludes that “emotional dependency by a President” on his
aides, “should be avoided as far as possible. The argument is that staff members
with prior experience have a positive relationship with the success of a relationship
and staff members with personal relationships to the President have a negative
relationship. Hoxie’s paper adds no empirical support to these conclusions. The
focus of this paper is to make “relationship” and “past experience” variables in the
model evaluating presidential success.
King and Riddlesperger modernize this argument in their evaluation of
the Clinton staffing choices (1996). They argue most definitively that a President’s
23

success in office is contingent upon the performance of the staffers he chooses for
administrative positions. King and Riddlesperger also provide the last variable
that this paper will test, staff that came from the campaign. Those involved on
a Presidential campaign will often be given a job in the administrations; this is
known as riding the President’s coattails. King mentions the prevalence of staffers
from the campaign but does not argue their directional effect on presidential
success.
As noted, the current literature on this topic does not provide any
empirical data on the topic so this paper is novel. This paper will either add
credence or help negate the previously mentioned work on this subject. It will be
the statistical backing to their assumptions and conclusions.1
After I had researched the historical commentary on this issue, I reference
past work on many closely related subjects to determine pertinent control
variables for the model and help define the dependent variable. Only recently has
the presidency been evaluated statistically: Bond and Fleischer (1990), Covington
et al (1995), Durham et al (2003) all test various political variables on the success
of the president. In these papers, roll call votes, compiled by Congressional
Quarterly, are used as numerical indicators of Presidential success in Congress.
Freund concedes that measuring Presidential success as the relationship between
the President and Congress is only perspective of “success” (2004). However, for
the purpose of this paper, that perspective will be used as the indicator of success.
Vital Statistics on the Presidency is a publication by Congressional
Quarterly that documents the success rate of Presidents from Eisenhower to
George W. Bush. The rate is measured as the number of bills that pass that a
1 David E. Lewis wrote The Politics of Presidential Appointments (2008) that performs statistical
analysis and regressions of staff characteristics on the success of Presidential administrations;
however, it focuses on the bureaucracy, and not senior officials (Assistants to the President). While
it was referenced for ideas, it was not heavily used in determining theory, model specification or
past works.
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President supports in addition to the number of bills that fail that a President does
not support divided by the total number of bills that the President takes a position
on (2008). This paper will use those same figures.
Rivers and Rose conducted a probability study of individual bills
supported by Presidential administrations, passing in the House of Representatives
(1985). Using a sample of over 400 bills from 1954 to 1972, they tested for the
effect of Presidential public opinion on the passing of presidentially backed bills.
Their results suggest that popularity is barely significant at the 10% level. The
study failed to control for the differing types of bills; they concluded that a bill on
the economy is equal to a bill on foreign affairs. With such a specific dependent
variable, that lack of clarity likely skewed their data.
Ostrom and Simon conducted a sample of Presidential legislative success
yearly from 1953 to 1980 and found public approval to be statistically significant
and positively correlated with success rates (1985). This much more exhaustive
study controls for several more factors than Rivers and Rose and evaluates success
overall rather than on individual bills. Ostrom and Simon provide public opinion
as a control for this paper.
Edwards, Barrett and Peake had a sample of 638 pieces of “significant”
legislation that failed to pass and evaluated that failure as a result of divided
government (1997). Divided government had a t-statistic of 4.00 and was
positively correlated with the failure of presidentially supported bills in Congress.
This led them to conclude that the party controlling Congress is significant in
determining the success rate of the President.
This paper will add to the literature that has regressed different
explanatory variables on legislative presidential success, while remaining
completely unique on the explanatory variables being tested. Previous regressions
will also be used as references for which to base control variables in this model
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on. With the amount of literature being written on this subject already, this should
be a powerful addition. Finally, the statistical findings of this paper will help to
refute some of the generalized commentary on presidential staffing.
III. Modeling
The goal is to see if presidential legislative success is significantly affected
by the type of staff members a President chooses as his Assistants. Specifically,
those members that served in previous administrations should positively influence
legislative success while those that worked on the campaign and have a personal
relationship with the President should negatively influence legislative success.
This hypothesis will be modeled using an entity-demeaned OLS
regression that averages the data for each administration from Gerald Ford to
George W. Bush, differentiating between first and second terms. The reason
is to eliminate any unobservable administration-specific – or term-specific –
characteristics that pertain to their success in the House of Representatives. For
example, Reagan may have had a better repertoire with members of the House of
Representatives that led to higher success rates. By averaging each President’s
success and deviating their individual successes from that mean, President specific
variables should be accounted for. The estimated model is:

SucRatet = β0 + β1*Approvalt + β2*Partyt + β3*Padmint + β4*Relatet +
β5*Campaignt + et (1)

The dependent variable is a President’s legislative success rate in the
House of Representatives, measured annually. This variable, SucRatet, is a
function of the bills that the President supported, that passed, and the bills that
the President opposed, that did not pass. I control for the effects of presidential
public approval and the majority party in the House of Representatives.
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Presidential public approval, as referenced in Ostrom and Simon (1985), reflects
the constituency’s support of the President’s agenda. The logic is that House
Representatives should largely vote similar to their constituency. Therefore, the
coefficient on Approval, β1 should be positive – the greater constituent approval,
the greater the presidential influence in Congress. The effect of political party in
the House of Representatives is a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the
House majority is the same party as the President and “0” if the House majority
is the opposite party of the President. As previously explained, if the House is the
same political party as the President, the House will likely agree with and pass
more of the President’s supported legislation. The coefficient on Party, β2 should
be positive also.
The variables measuring staff background – previous relationship to
the President, previous administration positions, and campaign work – are more
difficult to measure in the model. The Assistants to the President that also served
in previous administrations, the variable Padmint, are measured as a percentage
of the Assistants in any given year that have served under any previous President.
Hoxie suggests that previous administrative experience will aid the success
of the current President.2 As a result, the coefficient estimate on Padmint, β3 is
conjectured to be positive.
The Assistants to the President that were notably chosen for their
position because of their involvement in the Presidential campaign – either the
initial or, when appropriate, re-election, denoted by the variable Campaignt, are
measured as a percentage of the Assistants in any given year that were involved
in that President’s campaign. However, while campaign mentality is productive
and efficient in the eventual succession of the candidate to the Presidency, that
mentality becomes an inhibitor. The campaign mentality is idealistic and different
2 As noted above, Hoxie (1980).
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from the necessary productivity needed for legislative affairs and Congressional
communications. Therefore, I posit that the coefficient estimate on Campaignt, β4
will be negative.
Finally, there are the Assistants to the President that have had a
longstanding relationship with the President – likely a long term acquaintance or
friendship – is measured by the variable Relatet. It is measured as the percentage of
the Assistants that are chosen based on their personal affiliation with the President.
While friendships are key to the successful President, long term friendships and
personal relations could lead to bias in the President’s judgment. Again I speculate
that the coefficient on Relatet, β5 is negative.
In the data section I will explain the specific data sets used to describe
presidential success rates and the control variables but I will now briefly explain
how the characteristic variables were measured.
The White House, every year, produces The White House Government
Manual, which lists the Assistants to the President in the White House Office
(WHO). A large portion of those Assistants have profiles in Who’s Who in
American Politics, the autobiographies of the Presidents themselves, or in historic
reports on the individual Presidents and their staff. Congressional Quarterly has
been combining that data for their research guide to the evolution of the White
House Staff from George Washington to Barack Obama. Fortunately, I have
been part of that data collection. Every Assistant to the President listed in the
Government Manual for each year can be demarcated as being from a previous
administration (P), having a personal repertoire with the President (R), being
selected from the campaign (C), or being from none of these categories (N). Once
the total Assistants to the President have been tabulated and denoted with one or
multiple of these tags, they were then converted into percent form. The labels –
P, R or C – are then transformed into percentages of the total Assistants to the
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President for every year.3 Those percentages were then used as the annual values
to compare with the President’s legislative success rates.
IV. Data
This paper focuses on the period from 1974 when the Ford Presidency
began to 2008, the end of the Bush Presidency. CQ Press had compiled Presidential
Success Scores during that time that serve as the data set reflecting the dependent
variable in this study. Ideally, a variable would be created that composited several
administrative factors into the category of “Presidential Success.” However, this
paper is focusing solely on Presidential success in the legislative arena, particularly
the House of Representatives. As mentioned, CQ compiles this data as the percentage
of bills where the decision of Congress reflected the position of the President.4
The control variables include presidential public approval ratings and
whether the House of Representatives was the same political party as the President
in any given year. Previously written, the party variable is a dummy variable. The
public approval variable is an annual average of bi-weekly Gallup-Poll results on
the popularity of the President.
The data set on the staffing variables was generated – mentioned above
– from intensive research on the individual Assistants to the President and their
connection (be it campaign, relationship, or previous administration) to the
President. The amount of work that went into investigating the backgrounds
of these individuals attests to the accuracy of the data set. Previous literature,
including King and Riddlesperger (1996), has included variables such as
“relationship to the President” but they use estimates of the percentage of staffers
that are “friends” with the President over the course of their term rather than a
year by year analysis of the men that served in the senior staffing level positions.
3 That is labeled “Table 1: Assistant to the President Labels” and is located in the Appendix.
4 That is labeled “Table 2: Presidential Success Scores in the House of Representatives” and is located
in the Appendix.
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Before describing the data, it is important to note that the Ford Presidency
did not have any staffers from the campaign simply because Ford did not have
a campaign. Once Nixon resigned, Ford assumed the role of the Presidency,
with many of Nixon’s previous administration. He did not get to choose his own
people. This could bias the data so a separate regression will be run excluding the
data from 1974 through 1976 to see if any significant changes can be seen.
Before I continue, it is significant to note that from 1974 to 2008, the
number of Assistants to the President grew from 10 to 17 reaching record highs of
27 during the Clinton administration. As the number of Assistants grows so does
the number of people demanding the President’s attention and giving him advice.
This could affect the receptiveness of the President and the number of Assistants
that are actually influencing the President may be difficult to account for. It is the
hope in this paper that by using the entity-demeaned OLS regression some of
these unknown and uncontrollable factors will be reduced to a minimum so as to
get the most accurate results.
Figure 1: Variable Summary Statistics
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Min

Max

SucRatet

35

55.19%

20.79

15.4%

87.3%

Approvalt

35

51.63%

11.69

26.0%

73.3%

Padmint

35

23.6%

24.3

0.0%

92.0%

Relatet

35

25.6%

16.2

0.0%

63.0%

Campaignt

35

44.5%

24.5

0.0%

100.0%

Figure 1 depicts the summary statistics of the included variables except
for Partyt because that is a dummy variable. The statistics provide insight into
the evolution of staff through these recent administrations. In 1978, 100% of
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the Assistants to the President came from the campaign. President Carter was
dedicated to choosing those that had served him during the campaign. He was a
strong advocate of rewarding his staff.
In 1989, there was a 92% high of senior staff members that had come
from past administrations. When George H.W. Bush won election, the Reagan era
continued and he continued the previous administration with many of the same
Assistant staff.
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Figure 2: Presidential Legislative Success Rates in the House of
Representatives

1970

1980

1990
year

2000

2010

It is also noteworthy that at different times throughout the time period in
the study a President purged his staff of all those from a certain background. It is
clear that as directives changed in each administration, the types of senior staffers
were adjusted. Backgrounds were scrutinized and removed to help the President
succeed and receive good advice.
Interestingly, the legislative success rate of the President, on average for
every administration, is around 50%. The President will typically succeed half of
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the time and fail half of the time. This observation demands the answer as to how
a President can succeed more than 50% of the time. In fact, a successful President
could be evaluated as one who is above that threshold while a weak President is
evaluated as one below it.
The success over time

Figure 1: Staff % on campaign, relationship, previous
administration over time
1

graph is also shown in Figure 2. 	
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seems to be the inverse to the graph of presidential success over time. Finally,
campaign involvement also seems to inversely mirror presidential success,
although not as definitively.
V. Empirical Evidence
The table below shows the OLS regression results. Regression (1)5 was
not entity-demeaned so that it could be compared to Regression (2) that is entitydemeaned. The variation between the two regressions shows the necessity of using
entity-demeaned OLS because it controls for administration specific variables.

Figure 4: OLS results for the legislative success of the President
		

(1)

(2)

Popularity

.123

.024

		

(0.69)

(0.15)

Party		

36.12

46.92

		

(6.66)***

(8.35)***

Padmin		

6.92

26.89

		

(0.82)

(2.04)**

Relate		

15.80

11.12

		

(1.01)

(0.73)

Campaign

-4.54

18.93

		

(0.49)

(1.62)

Entity Demeaned

No

Yes

Observations

35

35

Adj-R-squared

0.73

0.83

Durbin Watson Stat

1.81

2.28

Serial Correlation

Possible

Possible

		

Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote level
of significance indicating 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

______________
5 This was my first regression performed; it was not until later that I realized I should account for
administration specific variables by using entity-demeaned OLS. That is why it is included.
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Both of these regressions included the data from 1974 to 1976 because
I first noticed the possibility of serial correlation, being that this data set is a time
trend. The Durbin-Watson statistic for both regressions falls within the uncertain
region of the critical Durbin-Watson statistic values. This led me to evaluate the
residuals against the lagged residuals (provided in Figure 5). Aside from a few
outliers, there is an upward sloping pattern in the residuals. I attempted to correct
for this serial correlation with a time trend and by weighting using the PraisWinsten method of Generalized Least Squared. However, the Durbin-Watson
statistic remained in the uncertain region.
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Figure 5: Residuals vs. Lagged Residuals, Regression (2)
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I corrected for the presence of autocorrelation using first differences
– the variable minus the one period lag of that variable. Those results, entitydemeaned, are provided in the table below. Regression (3) is the first difference
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OLS including the 1974-1976 time period and Regression (4) is the first difference
OLS excluding the 1974-1976 time period.
Again, the serial correlation was removed in Regression (3) – see Figure
7 – while it is still inconclusive as to the serial correlation in Regression (4).
The Durbin-Watson statistic for Regression (3) is above the upper critical statistic
while the statistic for Regression (4) is at the edge of the upper statistic.
Looking at both regressions numbered (3) and (4) we see that the
popularity coefficient, even differenced, remains statistically insignificant.
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that β1 is zero at even the 10% level of
significance. Also important to both regressions, the political party variable
coefficient, β2, is statistically significant in difference from zero at the 1 percent
level of significance. This significance was also seen in regressions numbered (1)
and (2) even prior to the first differences.
Figure 2: OLS results (serial correlation corrected) for the legislative
success of the President
1st Difference

(3)

(4)

Popularity

.172
(0.70)
77.92
(7.19)***
8.25
(1.77)*

.186
(0.73)
77.86
(11.29)***
8.01
(1.95)*

Campaign

-8.58
(1.77)*
-7.47
(0.56)

-9.54
(1.75)*
-7.32
(0.41)

Entity Demeaned

Yes

Yes

Observations

29

27

Adj-R-squared

0.71

0.71

Durbin Watson stat
Serial Correlation

2.34
No

1.97
Possibly

Party
Padmin
Relate

Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote level of significance indicating
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Focusing on Regression (3), we see that the coefficient on percentage
of Assistants that served in previous administrations is statistically significant
in difference from zero at the 10% level. As expected, the coefficient estimate
is positive. As a President adds staff members with previous experience, their
predicted legislative success is likely to rise. This makes sense because former
administration officials have already experienced the White House. They know
how it functions and how to perform best. Also, the coefficient on the percentage
of Assistants with a previous relationship to the President is statistically significant
in difference from zero at the ten percent level. Again, as expected by this paper’s
hypothesis, the coefficient estimate is negative. As assumed, and argued by Hoxie,
a relationship to the President deters that President’s success because they bias the
President’s judgment.
In both Regression (3) and (4), the coefficient on the percentage of
Assistants that originated from the campaign is not statistically significant in
difference from zero. Multicollinearity between Campaign and Relate was tested
but found to be minimal. It may just not be as important to determining presidential
success as suggested by previous literature or my hypothesis.
Using Regression (4) without the 1974-1976 time period, there are a few
slight differences. The coefficients on Party, Padmin, and Relate are largely to the
same magnitude and have largely the same t-statistics.
The Adjusted R-squared value in both is around 0.71 indicating that
71% of the variation in presidential legislative success scores is explained by the
variation in the included variables. The Probability>F value is also 0.000 for both
regressions indicating that a relationship does exist and that the R-squared value
is statistically significant in difference from zero.
This paper’s hypothesis suggested that the type of Assistants a President
picks for his senior staff influences his legislative success and that testable
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characteristics were Assistants from the campaign, from past administrations, and
with personal connections to the President. The results have shown that Assistants
to the President from past administrations and with relationships do matter while
there is not enough evidence to suggest such a relationship in those from the
campaign. Those from past administrations have a positive influence while those
with personal connections have a negative influence.
VI. Conclusions
The background of people chosen for Presidential Assistants is more
than important to the later success of that President. This staffing influence can
be witnessed historically and this paper has finally yielded empirical data on the
subject. A great amount of literature exists on the topic but only insofar as it assumes
conclusions without ever testing them. The reorganization of the Executive Office
of the President under the Nixon administration led many political writers to
examine the effect of staffers on the President’s administration. In the 1970s and
1980s, the universal conclusion was that the President should choose staffers with
prior experience while avoiding those people from the campaign and those with a
close personal repertoire with the President. While those positions were logically
argued, they were never empirically argued.
This paper aimed to test that hypothesis and add reasonable credibility to
the previous literature. Using the prior models of presidential success as a function
of legislative success in roll call votes, this paper tested the effect of Assistants to
the President on that success. The effect of Assistants to the President was tested
using three different characteristics: the percentage of the staff in each year that
came from the campaign, the percentage that had a personal relationship with
the President, and the percentage that had worked in a previous administration.
Controls were then added to account for presidential public approval and the
majority party in the House of Representatives.
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After correcting for autocorrelation in the time series and using entitydemeaned OLS to account for the immeasurable differences brought by different
administrations, I found that the type of staff chosen is significantly correlated
with presidential legislative success. The percentage of staff that had experience
from prior administrations is statistically significant and positively correlated.
The percentage of staff that had a relationship with the President is statistically
significant and negatively correlated. The percentage of the staff from the
campaign is negatively correlated but the coefficient is not statistically significant.
These results are aligned with the previous speculative literature and the control
variables are aligned with previous studies on their respective influence.
A further study could, as done by Rivers and Rose (1985), could examine
the effect of staff on the passing of individual roll call bills in the same time
period – 1974 to 2008 – to test their effects. This paper performed a regression on
the annual averages of public approval and staff percentages but individual bills
could be regressed in a snapshot of time, so as to confound the results with annual
averages. This study could also test for the differences of Assistant influence for
different bills – be it domestic, economic or foreign affairs. By differentiating
presidential legislative success into those three categories, we could get a much
more specific depiction of Assistant influence.
This paper’s findings are significant for media pundits, political advisors
and Presidents in the choosing of their staff. While a President may want to choose
those from the campaign or personal friends, this research suggests that they could
be a detriment to his legislative agenda. A President should look for experience. On
the same token, pundits and advisors can evaluate a President based on the staff he
has chosen and be able to cite these findings as evidence rather than using the mere
speculation of the past literature. Of course, this study alone should not be the only
criterion that a President uses. This statistical evaluation should just another tool.
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Appendix
Table 1: Assistant to the President Labels
Year

P (% P)

1974

5

(50)

R (% R)
3

(30)

C (% C)
0

(0)

10

1975

2

(22)

3

(33)

0

(0)

9

1976

0

(0)

2

(22)

0

(0)

9

1977

2

(25)

5

(63)

7

(88)

8

1978

1

(11)

5

(55)

9

(100)

9

1979

1

(10)

4

(40)

9

(90)

10

1980

1

(11)

4

(44)

6

(67)

9

1981

7

(54)

2

(15)

10

(77)

13

1982

3

(20)

6

(40)

8

(53)

15

1983

3

(18)

6

(35)

6

(35)

17

1984

4

(25)

4

(25)

6

(38)

16

1985

5

(55)

2

(22)

3

(33)

9

1986

4

(33)

0

(0)

3

(25)

12

1987

2

(15)

0

(0)

3

(23)

13

1988

0

(0)

0

(0)

3

(21)

21

1989

12

(92)

2

(15)

2

(15)

13

1990

12

(86)

3

(21)

3

(21)

14

1991

11

(73)

3

(20)

3

(20)

15

1992

9

(56)

1

(06)

5

(75)

16

1993

1

(08)

4

(33)

7

(58)

12

1994

2

(09)

6

(26)

13

(57)

23

1995

2

(08)

5

(20)

12

(48)

25

1996

2

(09)

6

(26)

9

(39)

23

1997

0

(0)

6

(23)

15

(58)

26

1998

0

(0)

7

(27)

16

(62)

26

1999

0

(0)

4

(15)

12

(44)

27

2000

0

(0)

4

(16)

12

(48)

25

2001

3

(18)

10

(59)

8

(47)

17

2002

3

(18)

7

(41)

10

(59)

17

2003

3

(23)

5

(38)

6

(46)

13

2004

3

(21)

6

(43)

6

(43)

14

2005

2

(13)

3

(19)

7

(44)

16

2006

2

(13)

2

(13)

7

(44)

16

2007

3

(18)

2

(12)

7

(41)

17

2008

2

(12)

0

(0)

6

(35)

17

40

Total Assistants

Table 2: Presidential Success Scores in the House of Representatives

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

SucRate
59.3
50.6
43.1
74.7
69.6
71.7
76.9
72.4
55.8
47.6
52.2
45
33.3
33.3
32.7
50
32.4
43.2
37.1
87.3
87.2
26.3
53.2
38.7
36.6
35.4
49.3
83.7
82.5
87.3
70.6
78.3
85
15.4
33.8
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The Rise of American Industrial and Financial Corporations
Elizabeth Laughlin
Abstract
This paper identifies and analyzes the steps the United States took in its progression
to an industrial nation. Launched by the merger movement in the late nineteenth
century, vertical and horizontal integration lead to trusts and monopolies in a
number of industries. Simultaneously, the labor market was undergoing a number
of reforms with the deskilling of workers. The rise of big business was made
possible through the growth of the financial sectors and companies such as
J.P Morgan. The case study of The Standard Oil Co. highlights the wealth and
power that robber barons such as J.D. Rockefeller held during this time period
and its continuing affects, including a widening of the distribution of wealth and
inequality.

I. Introduction
In the nineteenth century, the American economy underwent a period
of rapid expansion and change as a previously agricultural nation shifted into
an industrial one. Following the Civil War, there was an accumulation surge due
to new technological advances and managerial reforms that allowed for greater
control over workers, price, and output. Mass production of goods soared, as
well as a shift that occurred in the labor markets, moving from proletarianization
into homogenization. The rise of big business and corporate finance occurred
simultaneously and in turn, stimulated the economic growth at the time. This
growth, however, was concentrated in the monopolistic fortunes of the robber
barons. While a great deal of innovation and progress was seen with the rise of
the American industrial and financial markets, it also left the nation with rising
inequality and wage gaps that are still seen today.
II. The Merger Movement
While the majority of businesses industrialized in the 1870s, one industry
was ahead of its competitors. According to Alfred Chandler, author of The Visible
Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977), America’s first
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big business appeared in the 1850s with the railway system. At the time, only
major governmental organizations, such as the United States Post Office, were
employing more workers and controlling more money than the railroads. Chandler
further explains, “The great railway systems were by the 1890s the largest
business enterprises in the United States but also in the world… The railroad was,
therefore, in every way the pioneer in modern business administration” (1977, p.
204).
The change that the American railroads underwent forecasted what was
to come for the rest of American business. Expanding to unprecedented levels in
the 1850s, the railroads were responsible for 15 percent of gross private investment
in the economy during that period, increasing to 28 percent by the 1890s (DuBoff,
1989). Richard Tedlow, author of The Rise of the American Business Corporation
(1991), explains, “… the railroad was critical to American economic growth, and
the corporate form was critical to the growth of the railroad” (p. 15). This corporate
form that allowed for railroads to expand into big business was facilitated through
a surge of consolidations. Successful companies, such as W. H. Vanderbilt’s New
York Central Railroad, began to buy, lease, or form trusts with competitors and led
to industrial giants, not only within the railroad sector but extending throughout
all industries (DuBoff, 1989).
The consolidation movement was discussed above with respect to the
railroad system, however, the merger movement occurred throughout all industries
in the late nineteenth century. According to DuBoff, “… all those forces making
for big business coalesced in a tidal wave of mergers and consolidations” (1989,
p. 57), focusing largely on Alfred Chandler’s views on the managerial revolution
and technology as those main forces. Chandler believes that big business was a
result of inefficiency faced by many industries in the wake of expanding markets
and new technology (1977). In order to combat this inefficiency, Chandler asserts
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that the “visible hand” of management allowed for greater control and supervision
of employees and output. In his book, The Visible Hand, he explains,
In many sectors of the economy the visible hand of management replaced
what Adam Smith referred to as the invisible hand of market forces. The
market remained the generator of demand for goods and services, but the
modern business through existing processes of production and distribution,
and of allocating funds and personnel for future production and distribution.
As modern business enterprise acquired functions hitherto carried out by the
market, it became the most powerful institution in the American economy
and its managers the most influential group of economic decision makers
(Chandler, 1977, p. 1).
Chandler’s argument rests on the belief that progress and innovation with respect
to production and larger markets allowed for this change in management (1977).
Prior to the industrial revolution, corporations simply did not operate at such a
level that they demanded hierarchical administrators. However, once the markets
for goods and services expanded, this control over production and workers was
required. Corporations could no longer depend on market control to ensure its
efficiency. Instead, firms began to account for external market expansion and
grow internally through horizontal and vertical integration (ibid).
The merger movement saw a great deal of horizontal integration, as one
organization combined with its less successful competition to turn themselves into
large multi-unit companies. Within horizontally integrated businesses, managerial
power existed over the various departments, each with their own head (DuBoff,
1989). By acquiring the competition, these large-scale companies were able to
control prices and output over the entire market, as if it was a true monopoly
(Cashman, 1984).
As horizontal integration allowed for a greater distribution of power,
vertical integration involves a top-to-bottom accumulation of power. Vertical
integration allowed for greater production efficiency due to its ability to reduce
costs (Cashman, 1984). Chandler explicates that the first successful big businesses
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in the United States were those that implemented a higher level of management,
responsible for connecting the production and the distribution of goods. In
many firms, the corporate manager facilitated “the flow from the suppliers of
raw materials through all the processes of production and distribution to the
retailer or ultimate consumer” (Chandler, 283). Whether horizontally or vertically
integrated, the internalization of management led to lowered transaction costs,
increased production and more competitive prices (ibid.).
Innovations such as horizontal and vertical innovation cause the Gilded
Age to often be remembered as a time of continuous prosperity and growth.
However, in many industries, such as oil and steel, this is not the case (Cashman,
1984). Demand was always changing while excess capacity was a constant fixture
since 1873. Accumulation can only continue as long as capacity does not outstrip
demand, a problem that is often inherent to a capitalist economy, causing firms
to grow too large for their own markets, forcing companies to drop their prices in
order to produce some profits. Eventually, the entire market must drop their prices
as well. This cycle is known as destructive competition (DuBoff, 1989).
This problem of destructive competition was rampant in the late 1800s,
leaving many firms in a trapped, diminishing market. In hopes of combating
destructive competition, corporations sought to establish greater control over
production, prices, and profits through a number of agreements. Informal
agreements such as gentlemen’s agreements quickly lead to cartels and eventually,
trusts. Since trusts did not require a state charter, larger corporations were able to
force smaller firms to secede control, simply issuing trust agreements entitling
them to a percentage of profits (Prechel, 2000). As seen with the Standard Oil
Company, trusts were formed between firms to maximize control and expansion,
with hopes of eventually monopolizing. The Standard Oil Trust established by
Rockefeller gave trustees control of more than 90% of the oil industry. Growing
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wary of the power and size of companies such as Standard Oil, the federal
government implemented the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 in order to restrict
monopolies (ibid.). However, the Standard Oil Company, along with a handful of
other trusts of the period, survived as either a monopoly or oligopoly within their
respective industries well into the twentieth century (DuBoff, 1989).
The holding company of the late nineteenth century was critical in the
development of the modern corporation, providing the foundation for growth.
Harland Prechel’s book Big Business and the State focuses on the rise of
corporations and their legacy between the 1880s and the 1990s. However, he
addresses that the expansion of business corporations began as early as the first
half of the nineteenth century due to factors such as an increase in foreign demand
markets following the Napoleonic Wars and the introduction of canal and railway
transportation. He explains, “As the number of business enterprises increased, the
demand for business charters (i.e., certificates of incorporation) increased. These
charters focused on corporations’ capital structure and attempted to ensure the
rights of the public, creditors, and shareholders” (Prechel, 2000, p. 26).
Working together, forces, such as the managerial revolution, integration,
and technological advancements, provoked the merger movement of the late
nineteenth century. As described above with respect to the railroad companies,
a wave of consolidations overtook many industries during this time period.
According to DuBoff, over 2,653 large-scale businesses vanished in just four
years, from 1898 until 1902 (1989). A capitalist economy inspires natural
competition within industries, which comes with gains and losses. As the century
wore on, competition within industries steepened as new technologies and labor
processes were introduced, forcing holding companies to merge with their more
efficient competitors, leading to industry monopolies and the rise of big business
(ibid.).
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For the robber barons of the Gilded Age, the merger movement was
clearly beneficial as they gained greater market control. However, Chandler
argues that such mergers were rarely profitable until a middle management was
added (Chandler, 1977). Their prime responsibility was to plan and oversee the
increased number of operations within the newly merged company. Capitalists
such as Cornelius Vanderbilt or Andrew Carnegie remained as figureheads for
the company, but the day-to-day operations were left to a new level of middle
management. This development of the multidivisional structure essentially ended
entrepreneurial capitalism, while this new branch of management that resulted
from labor reform reshaped production and distribution processes, ensuring the
dominance of their company (Chandler, 1977).
III. Labor Reform
While companies were changing due to external markets, innovation
was also needed within the organization. Much of Chandler’s argument on the rise
of big business as discussed above relies on correcting the inefficient management
and labor techniques. Vertical and horizontal integration led to new managerial
hierarchy, which in turn created greater control and less autonomy for workers.
These managers, however, were the ones responsible for the shift within the labor
markets in the 1870s. During proletarianization, skilled workers and artisans held
a great deal of power over the organization. Attempts by management to cut costs
by reducing wages were unsuccessful because of this bargaining power. In order
to combat this and return the power to the executives, many corporations turned
to technology (Gordon et. al, 1982).
The introduction of technology during the late nineteenth century helped
to increase short-run efficiency of production by lowering costs and increasing
output. However, this was not its primary goal. New technologies were introduced
because it lessened the dependence on skilled labor for administrators. At the
47

time, “… workers were being transformed into appendages of machinery itself,
which was assuming almost-human attributes as it ‘takes the place of a mere
implement’” (DuBoff, 1989, p. 37). This magnifies the division of labor that
occurred within the homogenization of the 1870s. Technology helped to deskill
the labor, which in turn lessened workers’ bargaining power, restoring it to the
hierarchical management.
Similar to how investment led to greater market instability,
homogenization led to great labor instability. Employers adopted a divide-andconquer strategy within the workplace to encourage competition between workers
and weaken their unity. Through vertical and horizontal integration, employers
sought to divide workers through task variability and new job ladders (Gordon
et. al, 1982). While unions were productive outlets for negotiations within
proletarianization, technology made unionization and bargaining power obsolete.
This had a direct result on the workforce, in which “… the union’s prime weapon,
the ability to withhold the worker’s labor at peak spring production rushes, had
declined because the introduction of machinery made the molders’ skill obsolete”
(Gordon et al., 1982, p. 116).
The wave of immigration that occurred in the United States from
in the latter half of the eighteenth century furthered homogenization. With
various unskilled, ethnically diverse workers flooding American industrial
cities, employers found their ideal work group. Manipulating ethnic differences,
mangers forestalled assimilation into the workplace and amongst employees.
Large industrial firms quickly realized that by exacerbating ethnic and cultural
divides they could successfully fracture unionization. Without unions to bargain
wages and hours, the labor force essentially lost its control over its employers and
was replaced by a culturally divided and unassimilated set of unskilled workers
(Gordon et. al., 1982).
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As mentioned above, the wave of consolidations simultaneously led to
the development of a new level of administration in the form of middle managers.
While the emergence of financial corporation facilitated a great portion of mergers,
many industrial corporations grew large enough to require middle managers.
Responsible for the day-by-day production, these men oversaw market expansion
by inventing new techniques to increase production and distribution. For those
firms in an oligopolistic market, they also sought to destroy their competition. At
this level, competition was occurring at each stage of production. Therefore, “the
success of a firm depended primarily on the caliber of its managerial hierarchy.
Such quality in turn reflected the ability of the top executives to select and evaluate
their middle managers, to coordinate their work, and to plan and allocate resources
for the enterprises as a whole” (Chandler, 1977, p. 413). It is clear for one to see
how the not only the rise of middle managers, but also homogenization, shifted
the labor power from the workers themselves to the executive management.
As worker control enlarged in the latter part of the century, cost controls
were similarly increasing. The implementation of product cost accounting, which
measured a firm’s cost of materials, labor, and overhead, left capitalists with the
proper information to evaluate and minimize production costs (Prechel, 2000).
More specifically, as quoted by Prechel, “…(1) it compared total product costs
to market prices for each product, and (2) it directed mangers’ attention toward
shop-floor activities to identify and reduce production costs” (Prechel, 2000, p.
97). Although these changes were occurring in the early nineteenth century, the
expansion of industry and the managerial revolution furthered the importance of
product cost accounting and laid the foundation for corporate finance (ibid).
IV. The Rise of the Financial Markets
It is clear to see the influence that the railroads had, especially with
respect to investment. Investment quickly became the driving force of economic
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expansion. DuBoff explains, “… capitalism was evolving toward a strong
dependence on private autonomous investment as the prime mover of the
economy and investment was becoming the engine of growth and instability”
(1989, p. 42). The amount of capital witnessed in the latter nineteenth century
was unprecedented. While the accounting procedures in place at many large
corporations were effective in the early stages, production soon grew to be managed
without formal financial guidance (Prechel, 2000). Private investment banks and
the stock market became the primary resources that facilitated the role (ibid). In
his book Socializing Capital, William G. Roy focuses of the reflexivity within the
relationship between the growth of industry and financial capital markets. Citing
what many economists refer to as American’s first big business, the railroads,
he highlights how the establishment of railroad corporations was facilitated by
increased capital availability through loans, while the growth of the railroad
corporations simultaneously furthered growth within financial institutional
structures (Roy, 1997). Hugh Rockoff’s paper entitled “Great Fortunes of the
Gilded Age” specifically focuses on the returns that many capitalists experienced
during this age of expansion. He remarks, “an investment in the stock market at
the start of the Gilded Age would have increased, on average, by a factor of nine
by the end of the era” (Rockoff, 2008, p. 18) Essentially, these structures became
the proponents of their own expansion and of the financial markets.
The railroad industry not only pioneered the merger movement, but it
was also the contributed greatly to the emergence the financial markets, especially
with respect to its bonds and stock issues. “The stocks and bonds of railroads
all over the country began to be listed and actively traded on the New York
Stock Exchange as the capital of investors in this country and in Europe was
mobilized in support of railways” (DuBoff, 1989, p. 62). The railroad industry’s
exponential growth caused financial institutions such as investment banks to
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begin underwriting and mobilizing financial funds, as well as contributing their
own capital. The financial market aided in stabilizing destructive competition, a
major concern as discussed above, by overseeing corporate consolidations that
enabled firms to have control over prices once again (ibid).
In this time, a direct connection between American industry and
investment banks was forming. Banks were expanding outside their commercial
limits, including investment banking and stock ownership. The greatest example of
this blending between industry and finance can be seen in J. P. Morgan’s financial
empire. Morgan was the premier banker during the railroad consolidations,
including control over establishing the trust of Vanderbilt’s New York Central
Railroad. Morgan, furthermore, serviced the federal government and in the
1890s, a number of prominent life insurance companies, the largest net buyers
of corporate securities at the time. While facilitating the trusts within industries
such as the railroads, Morgan was simultaneously building his own “money trust”
during the evolution of financial markets (DuBoff, 1989).
V. The Great Robber Baron Fortune
As monopolies and oligopolies became more staple of the American
capitalist economy at the end of the nineteenth centuries, the industrial leaders
who controlled these companies were simultaneously becoming more prevalent in
society. Their mass wealth and influence created a shift toward plutocracy (Cashman,
1984). John Reagan, a congressman from Texas at the time, furthers this by saying,
“There were no beggars till Vanderbilts and Stewarts and Goulds and Scotts and
Huntingtons and Fisks shaped the action of Congress and molded the purposed of
government. Then the few became fabulously rich, the many wretchedly poor… and
the poorer we are the poorer they would make us” (Cashman, 1984, p. 51). While
these robber barons were reaping the rewards of the rise of big business, the general
American was suffering due to many of the reforms explained during labor reform,
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in turn producing rising inequality (Rockoff, 2008). Relying on a macroeconomic
framework, Rockoff’s concluding argument within his paper “Great Fortunes of the
Gilded Age” rests on four factors of the economy that allowed entrepreneurs of the
late nineteenth century to amass such wealth.
The first, relying on Chandler’s argument on the necessity for firms for
vertically integrated, explains how while the introduction of new technology
allowed for short-run efficiency and lower costs for management, there was also
a great deal of exploitation by the robber barons that led to their accumulation of
wealth. He explains, “It often took… ruthless ambition and a willingness to break
moral and legal constraints to succeed in exploiting the advantages created by
new manufacturing technology” (Rockoff, 2008, p. 27). This quote mirrors one
earlier discussed by DuBoff with respect to the Standard Oil Company’s relentless
expansion (DuBoff, 1989).
The argument continues to state that the economy of the Gilded Age
was favorable to robber barons, specifically in terms of property rights and taxes.
The property laws of the time were strongly protected, therefore allowing one
to purchase and develop land across the country or even foreign investors from
owning land in the United States. This increased capital flow from overseas
simultaneously increased the amount of American millionaires. Perhaps the
influential factor that allowed for the robber barons to amass so much fortune
was the lack of federal income tax. The income tax that was enacted during the
Civil War dissolved in 1872 and did not return until 1913. By this time, the ability
to reinvest all returns earned during investments without the any loss due to
taxes greatly impacted their savings and ultimately, led to the widening income
distribution that Rockoff uses as his last point (Rockoff, 2008).
Not only did the lack of an income tax allow for rising income inequality
but further, a shift from an agrarian economy to one of industry also impacts the
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distribution of wealth. Rockoff argues that the urbanization that is a direct result
of the industrial revolution produced increasingly skewed wealth. He is quoted
as saying, “In our list of millionaires, we can see a particularly straight channel
from urbanization to wealth inequality” (Rockoff, 2008, p. 28). Therefore, one
can plainly see how the industrial robber barons of the late nineteenth century
produced inequalities that our economy still battles today.
VI. The Standard Oil Company: A Case Study
Thus far, this paper has sought to examine transformation of industry
from family-oriented firms to large-scale monopolies and oligopolies, in which
robber barons controlled their own respective industry as well as the majority of
wealth and governmental power. One specific example of this is The Standard
Oil Company, a predominant oil refining company under the control of John D.
Rockefeller. DuBoff describes the company as one that “… became the image
of relentless expansion by any means it took to discipline an unruly industry and
achieve satisfactory control over prices and output” (DuBoff, 1989, p. 48). The
question of this case study becomes how did Rockefeller transform his company
into one of the most successful trusts of its time?
John D. Rockefeller’s began his entrepreneurial career in oil production
the 1860s. According to Cashman, he achieved success through four stages. “Initial
establishment of his own companies between 1862 and 1870; manipulation of
transportation for his own advantage; ruthless elimination of competition; and an
interlocking trust to unify his empire” (Cashman, 1984, p. 54). This empire first
began in Cleveland, Ohio, but would expand to include refineries in Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, and New York (Tedlow, 1991). Following fellow robber baron
Andrew Carnegie’s philosophy to “put all your good eggs in one basket and
then watch that basket”, Rockefeller made large-scale investments through the
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growing financial markets that allowed him to gain economies of scale in which
he constructed his monopoly (ibid.).
Establishing a new partnership with Henry M. Flager, increased capital
pushed further expansion into the Standard Oil Company. The official formation
of the Standard Oil Trust occurred in January of 1882. Unlike with a cartel or trade
association, the trust allowed Rockefeller and his subordinates to control multiple
subsidiaries across the country (Chandler, 1977). In 1866, a second refinery was
constructed in Cleveland and by 1869, the company was producing 1,500 barrels
of oil per day, triple what they produced just four years prior (Tedlow, 1991).
The sheer size and skill of Rockefeller’s refineries forced the unit cost to drop.
“This relationship of scale to costs has remained central to the structure of the oil
industry from that date to this. Thus, because Rockefeller’s Cleveland refinery
complex had become the largest in the industry, it also became its low-cost
producer,” Chandler explains (Tedlow, 1991, p. 34).
While unit costs may have plummeted, transportation costs were still
increasing, reaching $2.00 per barrel of oil from Cleveland to New York in 1870.
Rockefeller, however, was able to negotiate a 35% decrease in rates to $1.30 per
barrel in exchange for supplying 60 carloads of kerosene per day (Tedlow, 1991).
As discussed above with respect to the growth of financial markets, the use of
accounting procedures allowed Rockefeller to closely monitor his production and
distribution costs and in turn, lower them (Chandler, 1977). The railroads had
grown just as dependent on the oil industry as the oil industry was on the railroads.
With such low costs and high output, Rockefeller quickly conquered the Cleveland
market and expanded into other refineries. Already controlling transportation, he
sought to gain control over his competitors and supplies through the Standard Oil
“alliance”, trading Standard Oil stock for the assets of the competing firm. By
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1880, there were 40 firms in the alliance and Standard Oil was controlling more
than 90% of the market (Tedlow, 1991).
Rockefeller’s foresight into the future had not only led the company
to domestic domination, but furthermore, internationally. Rockefeller had
international ambitions since the beginning of his company. By 1888, these
ambitions were becoming reality as the company introduced a fleet of companyowned steam tankers in the Atlantic. Subsidiaries, whether wholly or partially
owned, were established throughout Europe by the 1890s, allowing for domination
of the oil industry well into the 1920s (Tedlow, 1991).
The success of The Standard Oil Company rested in John D. Rockefeller’s
ability to read his competition and inefficiency. Constantly improving his own
firm, Rockefeller was closing smaller, inefficient refineries in favor of building
larger, more productive ones into the turn of the century (Tedlow, 1991). His
rationalization of production allowed him to gain economies of scale, lower unit
costs, and eventually, reap the profits. Other attributes such as a steady supply
of raw materials, and investment in technology and research and development,
allowed Rockefeller, and so many of his capitalist peers, to transform an unknown
company, in which he contributed $2,000 of capital, into a multi-million dollar
global monopoly (Tedlow, 1991).
XII. Conclusion
The expansion that occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century
transgressed not only within the industrial sector, but also into the labor and
financial markets. Large-scale manufacturing due to new technological advances
led to a wave of consolidations and hierarchical management reform, leaving the
most successful firms of the period in a monopolistic and oligopolistic economy
with unprecedented amounts of capital. Case studies, such as J. P. Morgan and
the Standard Oil Company, highlight the control of industry, government, and
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wealth held by these industrial giants. While the innovation seen in The Gilded
Age resulted in massive growth in output and capital, eventually causing the rise
of big business and finance, it can also be remembered as a time of a divided
workforce and rising inequality.
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Japan as a Clean Energy Leader
Stefan N. Norbom
Abstract
Over the past several decades, Japan’s energy strategy had positioned it as the
world’s leader in clean and efficient electricity production and usage. This
strategy, heavily dependent on nuclear energy, was essentially destroyed by one
of history’s largest earthquakes, followed by a tsunami which overwhelmed five
nuclear reactors on March 11, 2011. As of April 2012, all of Japan’s 54 nuclear
reactors have been shut down and it is uncertain when and how many may be
restarted. This paper examines Japan’s options for crafting a new way forward
with an energy policy to power the world’s third largest economy while taking
into account the lack of domestic sources of fuel, high government debt, antinuclear sentiments and looming power shortages.

Introduction
Japan’s position as the clear leader in the area of clean energy has
been threatened by the earthquake, tsunami and resulting nuclear disaster at the
Fukushima Daiichi power plant. Japan needs to completely reevaluate its national
energy strategy but this does not mean that Japan has to abandon its position a
clean energy leader.
Over the past several decades, Japan has been a distinct leader in the area of
clean and efficient energy. A Forbes special report published in 2008 listed countries
leading in energy efficiency and the reasons why. Japan was #1 with energy (measured
in BTUs per dollar of GDP) two-times more efficient than the US, more than 7 times
efficient than China and 30 times more efficient than the Ukraine1
In general, much of this efficiency is driven by a country’s stage of development
and its access to fuel. Countries that are highly developed generally have higher
technology and place more emphasis on productivity and quality of life than
countries that are still pursuing quantum growth at any cost. Japan is highly
1 Zumbrun, Joshua. “The Most Energy-Efficient Countries.” Information for the World’s Business
Leaders - Forbes.com. 07 July 2008. Web. 09 Dec. 2011. <http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/03/
energy-efficiency-japan-biz-energy_cx_jz_0707efficiency_countries_slide_2.html>.
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developed but has almost no domestic sources of fossil fuel, so it uses these
precious imported resources as efficiently as possible. This is not only because
of the cost of importing fuel, but also in the interests of economic security, in that
more dependency on importing fuel, the greater the risk of external factors and
other countries controlling the direction of the economy.
Another indication of Japan’s leadership position in clean energy is
their leading role in the development and adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on
global warming, adopted December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. The UNFCCC is
an international environmental treaty targeting the “stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” As of September 2011, 191
states had signed and ratified the protocol, with the US being the only country to
have signed but not yet ratified.2
With its focus on energy security, Japan’s energy policy was highly
dependent on nuclear as a source. Figure 1 shows how nuclear has become
increasingly important to Japan’s energy strategy. Starting in the 1960’s, Japan
installed nuclear reactors that supplied close to one-quarter of its electricity supply
by 2004, and nearly 30% by early 2011 from 54 reactors in operation.3

2 Kyoto Protocol. (2010). In The Hutchinson Unabridged Encyclopedia with Atlas and Weather
guide. Retrieved from http://www.credoreference.com/entry/heliconhe/kyoto_protocol
3 Cleveland, Cutler. “Energy Profile of Japan.” Encyclopedia of Earth. 23 Apr. 2010. Web. 09 Dec.
2011. <http://www.eoearth.org/article/Energy_profile_of_Japan>.
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Figure 1: Japan’s electricity sources 1984-2004
Furthermore, Japan’s energy policy was set to grow its dependence on nuclear
energy to more than 50% of its supply by 20304. What could be better than clean
energy with a virtually unlimited supply of fuel?
A drastic change of plan
At 2:46PM on Friday, March 11, 2011, the most powerful known
earthquake to have ever hit Japan struck off its East coast. The earthquake had
a magnitude of 9.05, and triggered a disastrous tsunami, with waves reaching
heights of more than 40 meters (~130 feet) in the city of Miyako, in Tohoku’s
Iwate Prefecture. The earthquake knocked out the direct electricity supply to the
cooling system of the Fukushima reactor, however backup power supplies were
in place in the form of diesel generators and batteries. Then the tsunami struck the
Fukushima plant with a wave more than twice the height of what the plant had
been designed to handle. The two alternate sources of power were knocked out
4 Drysdale, Peter. “Japan’s Energy Options after Fukushima.” East Asia Forum. 5 Sept. 2011.
Web. 09 Dec. 2011. <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/05/japans-energy-options-afterfukushima/>.
5 Fackler, Martin. “Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan.” The New York TImes.
11 Mar. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/world/asia/12japan.
html?pagewanted=all>.
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and the cooling systems failed. No one could have anticipated or even imagined
the triple disaster of March 2011 -- an earthquake, tsunami and a nuclear accident.
Without cooling, the most daunting of the problems facing Japan
became containment after partial meltdowns in three reactors6. Radiation levels
skyrocketed to 400 times the normal level. More than 200,000 people were
evacuated from the surrounding areas. While still recovering from the severe loss
of life and infrastructure, the events of March 11 forced Japan to begin evaluating
options for a new energy strategy. Whereas Japan had considered atomic nuclear
energy as the most promising path to a future with clean energy, a September 2011
poll by Japan’s Mainichi Shimbun shockingly concluded that 74% of Japanese
wanted to gradually phase out nuclear power completely. Following the crisis,
former Prime Minister Kan announced future plans for a bottom-up review of
the country’s nuclear-focused Basic Energy Plan. Authored by the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in collaboration with private power utilities,
the plan announced the construction of fourteen additional nuclear power plants
by 2030. Now Japan is forming a new national energy policy plan and is currently
at a crossroads: should the country continue with their nuclear-centered plans
based on economic security, or should Japan pursue another energy plan that may
present a more acceptable path for its people?
Considerations of the new strategy
As the Japan government considers its strategy, there are several elements
that need to be kept in mind and balanced:
Cost – What is the upfront investment and on-going costs give Japan’s government
debt already reached 220% of GDP?7
6 CNN Wire Staff. “3 Nuclear Reactors Melted down after Quake, Japan Confirms - CNN.”
Featured Articles from CNN. 06 June 2011. Web. 09 Dec. 2011. <http://articles.cnn.com/201106-06/world/japan.nuclear.meltdown_1_nuclear-reactors-fuel-rods-tokyo-electric-power?_
s=PM:WORLD>.
7 “List of Sovereign States by Public Debt.” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. 6 Dec. 2011. Web.
09 Dec. 2011. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_sovereign_states_by_public_debt>.
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Speed of implementation – How soon can this be implemented in a significant way?
Long-term potential – How soon can alternatives be implemented and what is the
ultimate potential that an electricity source can provide.
Energy security – Does this fit Japan’s goal of being economically secure with its
energy sources?
Cleanliness – Does it meet Japan’s goal of clean energy?
Acceptance – Will the public accept the solution?
The strategic investment options can be viewed as follows with a high level
assessment (R being bad, Y being challenging, G being good) of each alternative
based on the above factors. Also noted is the supply situation as of 2009, which
shows the heavy reliance on nuclear and fossil (oil, LNG and coal):8
Strategic Assessment (2009)
Generation

Supply

Cost

Speed

LT Pot

Secure

Clean

Accept
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Fossil
Hydro

27%
63%
8%

G
G
G

G
Y
R

G
G
R

G
R
G

G
R
G

R
Y
G

Renewables

<2%

R

R

G

G

G

G

Distribution &
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-

R

Y

G

G

G

G

Control
consumption

-

G

G

G

G

G

Y

Green use

-

R

Y

G

G

G

Y

Table 1: Strategic assessment of energy investment options

It is worthwhile to look at each of these areas to assess the relative
benefits and negatives to being part of the new Japan energy strategy.
Re-introduction of nuclear energy
Today, only eleven of the fifty-four nuclear reactors in Japan are
operating. Most of these were not affected by the March events, but have stopped
operating due to the regulatory requirement for maintenance shut down every 13
months. To restart after maintenance, not only does the nuclear regulatory agency
8 “Japan.” Country Analysis Briefs. Mar. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011. <http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/
Japan/pdf.pdf>.
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need to give its approval but also the local government. It is the second half of
that process that is proving difficult – local government is voted in by the people
and the majority of people are against nuclear. If no reactors are restarted, all 54
will be shut down by April 2012 – 13 months after the events at Fukushima.
This could put a tremendous strain on Japan’s economy, as it is difficult
to cope with eliminating 30% of the power supply within such a short period. As
we saw in the strategic assessment, there is no way to instantly replace this supply
shortfall. The only solution would be a reduction in consumption and then, over
time, fossil fuel sources can be built-up, and renewables in the long run.
The following is the view of 50 major companies, both Japanese and US,
that comprise the US-Japan Business Council (USJBC), which met in New York
on December 1-2, 2011: “Japan has a world-leading nuclear energy industry. As
with renewables, nuclear energy offers virtually emissions-free power generation
and requires no fossil fuel imports. It accounted for about 30 percent of Japan’s
power generation capacity prior to the events of March. The Council recommends
that Japan promptly re-start nuclear power stations after assuring their safety. It
would be unrealistic to expect that other sources of power generation could be
built rapidly enough to offset a complete elimination of nuclear energy, and the
costs would be high. Jobs and economic development should also be considered.
For Japan’s industry to succeed internationally, it is imperative for the country to
maintain a strong domestic nuclear energy capability.”9
The USJBC view represents a less-emotional, more practical perspective
given the alternatives available. Yet the political situation will make this difficult
to accomplish without a great deal of analysis and debate.
Conventional fossil fuels
Although Japan’s goal is move towards green technology that utilizes
9 Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City,
December 1-2, 2011
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renewable resources, conventional fossil fuels cannot be overlooked since it
would take decades until renewable energy is a viable major source of energy.
Currently Japan imports a high amount of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and with
the recent discovery of unconventional gas reserves through shale, it seems more
economically efficient and feasible to exploit this opportunity. One issue that
Japan is currently facing as an importer of gas has to do with the scarcity of gas,
which allows other countries with reserves to control and drive up the price. With
the increase in supply of gas by 33%10 (2015), which is due to the discovery
of unconventional gas reserves, the overall prices of gas should begin declining
(Refer to Figure 2). Recently the IEA has predicted that by 2035, unconventional
gas will account for a staggering 35% of new global energy by 203511.As it
becomes a more dominant source of energy, incentives will arise to innovate and
create technology based solution that would mitigate the environmental impacts
of gas thus making it even more clean.
Although coal has drawbacks of environmental pollution through the
emission of green house gasses, coal currently is a reasonably priced fuel source12.
Clean coal technology, while expensive, allows industries to capture the carbon
that would be emitted prior or following the combustion process.
It is clear that fossil fuels need to be used to some degree, in the shortterm in order to meet Japan’s energy needs. Through innovation, firms will be
able to minimize the environmental costs of fossil fuel use until renewable energy
becomes a viable option in the long term. 13

10 Presentation by Department of Energy Representative at USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City,
December 1-2, 2011
11 Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City,
December 1-2, 2011
12 Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City,
December 1-2, 2011
13 Presentation by Department of Energy Representative at USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City,
December 1-2, 2011
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Figure 2: Recent trends of gas energy

Hydroelectric power
Hydroelectric power is clean and secure from an economic point of view,
thus Japan has fully focused on exploiting this as a source of power and has grown
capacity to 8% of total. Unfortunately, Japan has a limited geographic space and
limited usable rivers and has already harnessed all major sources, so this does not
represent a viable option for expansion in the future.
Other renewable energy
When considering renewable energy other than hydroelectric,
the main alternatives are wind, solar and geothermal power.

Prior to his

resignation, Prime Minister Kan announced a bold objective to increase
the supply of renewable energy from its current contribution of less than
10% to 20% by the 2020s.

The planning agency of Japan’s economy,

METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) outlined aggressive
objectives for both solar and wind power as can be seen in the chart below:
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Figure 3: Objectives for solar and wind power
Geothermal was essentially considered as having little potential due to cost and,
again, geographic limitations.
For any country, having a large supply of electricity from renewable
resources provides numerous benefits. Specifically, renewable energy can be
incorporated into Japan’s electricity production strategies while not adding any
greenhouse gas emissions to the environment. But incorporating renewable
energy such as solar and wind power is no easy task. The following are obstacles
that would need to be addressed: (1) The energy that would be produced from
solar and wind are determined by the availability of sunlight and wind, therefore
there is necessary research and development required in order to increase the
efficiency and stability of these technologies; (2) Policies need to be developed
to accelerate the onerous approval and review process currently in place in Japan;
(3) at its current scale and technology, renewable energy is far more expensive
than conventional fossil fuels, and (4) It takes a great deal of time and effort
to build sufficient scale to be a significant contributor to the overall capacity.
Because of these issues, Japan currently generates less than 1% of its power from
solar and wind power but has committed, nonetheless, to move aggressively in
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this direction. One recent positive sign -- the Action Plan to Stabilize Energy
Demand-Supply was announced on November 1st, 2011, and this plan will address
the regulations making renewable energy a more viable energy option.
In terms of the costs of wind and solar energy, technology has advanced
at an incredible rate and the cost gap is closing on conventional fossil fuels.
Some believe that, if the cost of CO2 and other emissions are considered, the cost
equation is even closer. As an example, technology has advanced in the wind
turbine area so that a single wind turbine can support the energy needs of 700
homes today versus only 420 homes in 2005.14 Similar advances have been made
in the solar energy area.
Technology advancements in storage and transmission and management
can also address the stability of these power sources, but again this will take time.
While solar and wind can be a major contributor to Japan’s power supply, there will
need to be other solutions to fill the short and medium term needs of the country.
Distribution and usage control
One major opportunity for Japan lies in the integration and distribution
of technology that can control the usage of energy resources, which is further
enforced by the estimate that only 70% of energy produced actually is productively
used.15 Through three major improvements, enormous benefits can be captured:
Japan currently has one grid operating on a 60 Hz and one on a 50 Hz16, one
supplying the east and one supplying the west. This network connection issue
is problematic because of the reduction in flexibility if one system experiences
a power outage. Following the March 11th tsunami and earthquake, the two
incompatible systems prevented eastern Japan from “borrowing” electricity from
western Japan. A second issue is the grid reliability: through developing smarter
14 USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, December 1-2, 2011
15 USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City, December 1-2, 2011
16 Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City,
December 1-2, 2011
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software systems the grid reliability and efficient usage of energy can be greatly
improved. As recommended by the USJBC members, the United States and Japan
should work together and develop a framework that will increase the efficiency of
the distribution grids, through the integration of information and communication
technologies into the already existing infrastructure17. The final improvement
involves research and development in order to improve energy storage capability.
Doing so would have three major benefits: (1) Secure supply to critical operations
and facilities (examples: hospitals, communications, and nuclear power plants).
(2) Facilitate energy stability management and peak demand. (3) And the
successful integration of renewable energy into grid18. Therefore there is also a
need for innovation in developing superior large size batteries to bring stability to
the grid systems, particularly to renewables sources that have inherent variability.
The Japanese Government successfully established power-saving targets
to avoid rolling blackouts in various areas of Japan during the peak summer season.
Major users of electricity cut their consumption by up to 25%, while smaller
industries reduced electricity consumption by 20%, and household 15-20%19.
The potential energy efficiency increase could be enormous by incorporating a
demand side program, which would increase the consumption and distributions
of energy sources.
Supply or demand-based solutions – the Nautilus proposal
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, located in San
Francisco, Seoul, and Melbourne have analyzed and suggested that there are
essentially two approaches to the problem – either central supply control or
demand and usage control.
17 Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City,
December 1-2, 2011
18 Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City,
December 1-2, 2011
19 “BBC News - Japan Sets Power-saving Targets to Avoid Blackouts.” BBC. 8 Apr. 2011. Web.
09 Dec. 2011. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13008846>.
68

The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) provides electricity to
nearly 45 million people or 35% of Japan’s population, while 12 million others
are served by Tohoku Electric Power Company. Both TEPCO and Tohoku have
announced power rationing programs, including rolling blackouts in many areas
not affected by the earthquake and excluding central Tokyo20. Clearly TEPCO
and Tohoku will struggle to fulfill Japan’s electricity needs in the short term. The
alternative “Best Case” scenario strategy, as outlined by Nautilus, focuses on the
inevitable supply shortfall the two electric companies will experience, and which
is likely to last five years. During this time, the condition of the existing nuclear
and thermal reactors would be evaluated. The plan would also promote firms and
individuals to employ “demand-side” alternatives, or energy-efficient and energysaving techniques and regulate electrical distribution at the customer site, rather
than using central power stations21. This demand-side approach would aim to
generate excess energy, which could then be distributed through a smart grid that
can accept power inputs, and re-distribute at a local level. For example, an office
building could be equipped with a photovoltaic array on the rooftop that helps
power the building22. The grid approach would allow intermittent renewable
energy use to be scaled up, together with an aggressive program promoting
extremely efficient end-use technologies, as well as energy conservation and
peak power management23. This approach is believed to be cheaper, quicker,
environmentally cleaner, and less risky in the short and long run, than relying on
susceptible costal thermal or nuclear power plants to fulfill the demand for power.
20 “See, for example Tohoku Joins Tepco in Rationing Power”, Japan Times, March 16, 2010,
[retrieved 17 March 2011] <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110316a5.htm>.
21 Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
22 Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
23 Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
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The Nautilus report compares two approaches to the issues faced by
Japan: The first deals with energy efficiency, renewable energy and distributed
generation (EE/RE/DG) estimated to cost US$11 billion per year.24 The second
includes central station gas and nuclear plants, estimated at US$10 billion/year.25
Cost not withstanding, the long and short term benefits of each option provide
very different results.
While the EE/RE/DG scenario is more costly in the short-run, over time
as the program is deployed, it should prove to be a more cost-effective solution
when taking into account the benefits of an early recovery that would otherwise
result in unmet electricity demands. In addition, the demand-side management
program, which would begin in the TEPCO/Tohoku service territories, ramps up so
quickly that by the second year of the program, it saves 2% of sales annually. The
program commands quick deployment over the next four years of energy-efficient
and renewable sources, and consumer-site, gas-fired generation. Based on initial
estimates, the program would be able to provide 81 TWh of delivered electricity
supplies annually after the four-year implementation stage, in addition to 22 GW
of delivered summer peak power26. This option would also bring emissions of
50% less carbon dioxide, which would aid in Japan’s ambitious green house gas
emission reduction goal, supporting the development of a “green economy.”
Another benefit is the ease of implementation. Although costly, it would begin
producing and saving power immediately, in comparison to the central station
option which would take three years or longer to implement, which would mean
high costs from unmet electricity demand. While the EE/RE/DG program would
24 Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
25 Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
26 Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
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cost 14 cents/kWhe, the central station alternative would amount to 12 cent/
kWhe, but considering the uncertainty of the central station alternative, the cost
would be much higher than 14 cent/kWhe27. The destruction caused by the March
disasters means Japan will rebuild a significant amount of infrastructure, at an
estimated cost of US$310 billion. New infrastructure provides an opportunity to
supply electricity grids, factories etc. with the most energy-efficient technology,
incorporating “smart grid” technology28. The benefit of pursuing EE/RE/DG is
difficult to calculate, but the marginal cost needed to bring improvements could
create incentives for investment into larger market energy efficiency, demandside technologies (such as solar hot water and solar photovoltaic systems) and
distributed generation in Japan29. And the estimated total savings from this
approach would be significant and possibly displace 50 million tons of carbon
dioxide from thermal power plants.30
A holistic approach with emphasis on demand side control
At the USJBC Annual Meeting on December 1st and 2nd, it was
extensively discussed to take a holistic approach by creating an intelligent and
diverse energy system.31 In doing so it will decrease the risks and costs associated
with energy supply and production while at the same time making Japan’s energy
processes more cost-effective and efficient. The common opportunity presented
in this approach, but more heavily stressed in the Nautilus approach, is the focus
27 Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
28 Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
29 Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
30 Von Hippel, David, and Kae Takase. “The Path from Fukushima: Short and Medium-term Impact
of the Reactor Damage Caused by the Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of Japan’s Electricity
Systems.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2011.
31 Supplemental statement on Energy and Environment, USJBC Annual Meeting, New York City,
December 1-2, 2011
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on demand side programs, which entail capturing a greater proportion that 30%
of the electricity wasted through improving the efficiency of existing systems
while also cutting demand with improved technology, monitoring and controls.
The practicality, emissions and low costs in comparison to alternative approaches,
associated with demand side, indicates that greater emphasis should be placed on
increasing energy efficiency through developing smarter systems.
The priorities under this approach with an emphasis on demand-side
efficiencies would be as follows:
•

Close the short-term supply-demand gap through 1) policies and
incentives to encourage overall and peak demand reduction; 2) restart the
newer nuclear reactors located in areas considered safe from earthquakes
and tsunami risk.

•

Formulate policies to increase the research and development and
manufacture of smart grid, energy storage and clean distributed energy
solutions to reduce the need for energy supply.

•

Encourage installation of the most efficient gas-generated thermal energy
systems as these are the cleanest and lowest overall cost (inclusive of
consideration of emissions) alternatives to nuclear power that can be
installed within the short term and take advantage of the new supply of
unconventional gas.

•

Put in place policies and incentives to encourage the rapid installation
of renewable energy systems as these will be clean, cost competitive
solutions in the long term, but need to be started now to be a significant
part of the solution.

With these priorities in place, Japan can quickly address its energy needs and
move confidently into the future with a clear path to maintaining its secure energy
position and role as clean energy leader.
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An Attempt to Reshape Capitalism’s Image
Ross Nichols
Introduction
John Stuart Mill claimed to be a disciple of both Jeremy Bentham and
David Ricardo. This was a strange proclamation because each man advocated a
competing theory of value; Bentham’s utilitarianism laid the foundation for the
utility theory of value and Ricardo developed the labor theory of value. Mill’s
goal in attempting to unify these theories of value was to provide a solution
for the growing class conflict that plagued capitalism. Class conflict arose as
feudalism was phased out and industrial capitalism replaced merchant capitalism
as the dominant economic system. The Corn Laws symbolized this competition
between classes. Capitalists were against the Corn Laws because the subsequent
tariffs would lower their rate of profit. Landowners supported the Corn Laws
because they increased the rent on land. Even Karl Marx held spoke out against
the Corn Laws on behalf of the working class. Capitalism fostered persistent
antagonism between classes as each struggled to gain or maintain power; no class
was immune from this contest. Class conflict was therefore ubiquitous in capitalist
society and generated widespread scrutiny and debate over capitalism. Jeremy
Bentham and David Ricardo took opposing sides in this debate. Bentham was
initially supported it but died a reformist. Class conflict was resolvable but not
under the current form of capitalism. Ricardo’s labor theory of value promoted
the view that class division occurred naturally in a capitalist society. And since
capitalism was the best possible economic system, class division was a necessary
evil and could not be remedied. Both Ricardo and Bentham acknowledged
that class conflict was inherent in capitalism but each treated it differently. In
claiming to be a disciple of both men, Mill hoped to show that capitalism could
exist alongside social harmony. His goal was to change the nature of capitalism.
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To achieve this, Mill had to accept both utilitarianism and the labor
theory of value, and reconcile their differences. He was ultimately unsuccessful.
Mill made so many qualifications to both Bentham’s utilitarianism and Ricardo’s
labor theory of value that he argued against them. While Mill did formulate
a philosophy of utilitarianism, it challenged Benthamite utilitarianism on a
fundamental level. Bentham focused on individual utility but Mill was more
concerned with social utility. Mill’s split from Ricardo was even more drastic.
He accepted the labor theory of value, but on the strict condition that the ratios
of capital to labor were equated across industries. Mill realized the unlikelihood
of this ever occurring and promoted a Smithian adding-up theory of value as
a generally more applicable measure of value. Thus while he claimed to be a
disciple of both Bentham and Ricardo, Mill modified their theories to such
an extent that his own utilitarianism and theory of value were contradictory.
However, Mill’s attempt at reconciliation should not be viewed in vain. His was
the most concerted effort to unite utilitarianism and the labor theory of value. He
made the best attempt at reshaping the image of capitalism.
This paper will begin by discussing the origin of the contrasting theories
of value in classical political economy. The first section will describe Adam
Smith’s unsuccessful search for an invariable measure of value. An analysis of
Benthamite utilitarianism and Ricardian labor theory of value will follow. Each
theory treats the class conflicts that erupted during this time period differently. It
is critical to examine these perspectives because they were the basis for Mill’s
attempt at reconciliation. After Bentham’s utilitarianism and Ricardo’s labor
theory have been discussed, Mill’s own utilitarianism and theory of value will
be evaluated. There were parallels in Mill’s thought that linked him to his idols,
which will be discussed briefly. The differences in thought represented his
attempt at synthesizing the competing notions of value. These will be studied
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closely. During this analysis it becomes clear that Mill betrayed his allegiances
to both Bentham and Mill and as a result, ultimately failed in his attempt to recast
capitalism. This will be addressed in the conclusion. The conclusion will also
compare Mill’s hopeful outlook on capitalism with Marx’s critical perspective of
it.
An Elusive Measure of Value
The utility and labor theories of value resulted from the inability of Adam
Smith to find an invariable measure of value. Despite his attempts to develop a
theory of prices, Smith was unable to derive a theory in which prices of goods
were explained by something other than prices. This led economic thinkers to
seek out determinants of value that were independent of prices. Two theories
arose. One argued that the amount of labor embodied in a good determined
value and the other contended that value lay in the utility a good provided.
Jeremy Bentham was the leading advocate of the subjectivist utility theory of
value while the objectivist labor theory of value originated with David Ricardo.
Yet although the foundations of each theory are distinctly different, noticeable
overlaps formed between the two. Policy was the most prevalent example of this.
Many objectivists promoted policies similar those prescribed by Bentham and
numerous subjectivists endorsed policies comparable those supported by Ricardo.
John Stuart Mill is the most intriguing example of this overlap. His social policies
paralleled Benthamite thinking but his economic policies were analogous to
Ricardo. Thus Mill exhibited both Benthamite and Ricardian influences. While
two invariable measures of value were found, it did not seem as if the related
theories of value were mutually exclusive.
Adam Smith constructed his theory of prices on the argument that
human labor determined the value of a good. However, unlike the labor theory
of value, Smith believed labor determined exchange value only in the “early and
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rude state of society” (Smith, 1869 [1783], 49). After a society progressed to a
capitalist economy, price was determined by wages, rent and profit; an adding up
theory of value. Smith contended a labor theory of value no longer held when
profits were introduced because they had no relation to the labor embodied in a
commodity (Hunt, 2002, 52). Smith thus believed that while labor embodied in
a product still remained proportional to the price of good, it could no longer be
its sole determinant. He also posited the notion that value of capital per worker
varied by industry (Hunt, 2002, 52). As a result, profits and wages created a price
disproportionate to the amount labor embodied in the production of a good. But
Smith never articulated a method to determine how labor embodied in a good
influenced its price in this scenario.
Two critical problems arose from Smith’s theory of prices. First, in
stating that prices were determined by wage, rent and profit, Smith derived prices
from prices. This meant his theory of prices rested on circular reasoning. Second,
Smith was able to make inferences about the general price level but he failed to
mention anything about the relative value of goods. An implicit consequence
of Smith explanation of prices in terms of other prices was that if any of the
cost components rose, the value of that good had to rise as well. Yet Smith also
believed that the value of capital per worker varied by industry. The effect of a
price increase in a common input would have an effect on the price of a good
proportional to its dependency on that input in production. Commodity prices
would thus increase by the different amounts (Hunt, 2002, 55). These faults
in Smith’s theory of prices ignited a search for invariable measures of value.
Bentham argued that the utility of a good determined its worth, Ricardo believed
the amount of labor embodied in a commodity determined its value.
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Two Solutions to Smith’s Dilemma
Bentham’s utilitarianism is best exemplified in his claim that “nature
has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure” (Bentham, 1823 [1789], 1). He reasoned that all human behavior
could be reduced to either seeking out pleasure or avoiding pain. And since he
considered humans to be rational, they naturally sought to maximize pleasure and
minimize pain. Measuring the amount of pleasure or pain an experience generated
could be reduced to a simple calculation. For an individual, pleasure and pain
were measured by an event’s intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity
and purity; when an action involved multiple people its effect on others was also
taken into account (Bentham, 1823 [1789], 30). Propinquity is the nearness in
time this sensation will be felt. Fecundity was the likelihood of a pleasurable
act continuing to generate pleasure. Purity was the chance this same act would
not cause pain later. Actions with a high utility were considered beneficial and
moral and actions with a low utility were detrimental and immoral. The interests
of the community then simply became the aggregate of these individual utilities.
However, Bentham considered the community a fictitious entity (Manning, 1968,
17). It was possible to measure a community’s happiness, but it could not be
studied apart from the aggregation of individual utility. Utilitarianism was thus
focused solely on the individual. Bentham acknowledged the implicit difficulty
of individual utility measurements but he feared that without it, people would
behave irrationally (Manning, 1968, 35). This confidence in utilitarianism was
the basis for his theory of value.
Bentham’s utility theory of value was rooted in felicific calculus, which
he believed was applicable to all aspects of life and included the purchase of
commodities. The more pleasure someone derived from a good, the more they
would be willing to pay for it. Bentham argued that the value of good was
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dependent on the likelihood someone had it, the amount of time the owner would
have it, and the length of time it took the owner to attain the good (Bentham, 1823
[1789], 32). This adherence to felicific calculus allowed Bentham to articulate
a method for determining the price of a good without using other prices. He
also came close to defining marginal utility. Once wealth had been accumulated
beyond the subsistence level, the happiness gleaned from every additional unit
of decreased. Eventually people would become indifferent at the prospect of an
additional unit of wealth. The utility theory of value became a relevant solution
to Adam Smith’s problem. However, Jeremy Bentham was not the only person to
develop a non-circular theory of value.
David Ricardo began his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
by conceding that utility was present in all goods but that it also had no influence
over exchange value. To highlight his point, Ricardo compared gold and water
(Ricardo, 1876 [1821], 9). Gold is much more valuable than water but the latter
has many more uses he argued. Price therefore had to be determined by something
else. Ricardo believed that scarcity and the labor embodied in the production of a
good determined its value (Ricardo, 1876 [1821], 9). And since Ricardo focused
on everyday commodities, exchange value was determined almost entirely by the
labor embodied in a good, which was present in several different forms. Present
labor was the labor required to produce the final good. Past labor created the
intermediate goods and tools used in the production of the final good. If a good
required specialized or more educated labor, this was also factored in. Thus
Ricardo also developed a theory of value that also avoided Adam Smith’s circular
reasoning. Yet while the labor theory of value stood in contrast to the utility
theory of value, the two men had a strong friendship and Ricardo adhered to a
philosophy akin to utilitarianism.
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Cremaschi 2004 argued that Ricardo drew much of his philosophy from
Thomas Belsham, a minister. Belsham believed that utility was important on
a universal scale in order to promote the greatest amount of happiness to the
greatest amount of people (Belsham, 1801, 432 cited in Cremaschi, 2004, 391).
Ricardo agreed with this view on utility so he necessarily agreed with Bentham
in that the principle of utility was needed to determine moral standards. Where
Ricardo differed from Bentham was the extent to which this felicific calculus
could be applied. He felt it was impossible to compare individual measurements
of happiness (Cremaschi, 2004, 390). This is why Ricardo maintained that labor
was better determinant of value than utility. Felicific calculus could not work if
every source of happiness was incomparable to every other source of happiness;
this applied to commodities as well. Although Ricardo purported a different
value theory than Bentham, they agreed that the principle of utility was could
be used to determine the “greater good”. The relationship between Ricardo and
Bentham is thus itself the beginning of the overlap in classical political economy;
Ricardo accepted the presence of utility in commodities but he did not agree with
Bentham’s method for determining value. It was possible to consider one theory
of value superior while simultaneously advocating policies associated with the
founder of the opposing theory of value.
Rational subjectivists such as Jean-Baptiste Say, Nassau Senior and
Frédéric Bastiat promoted the utility theory of value but their view on policy
was much more similar to Ricardo than Bentham. They advocated freedom
from government intervention and argued for free trade and existing property
laws. Although Bentham originally supported laissez faire capitalism, he became
a reformist and promoted the reallocation of wealth and income, in addition
to amending property laws. This reformist attitude was shared by Ricardian
Socialists like Thomas Hodgskin and William Thompson. These men favored
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redistributing wealth from the capitalists to the laborers and giving workers more
control over the means of production. While the two theories of value remained
distinct, they did not govern one’s views on policy.
The fact that proponents of the labor theory of value argued for reform of
capitalism and that utilitarians contended social harmony already existed hinted at
a split within classical political economic thought that was deeper than the utility
and labor theories of value. Treatment of class conflict was the root cause of the
schism in classical political economy. The class that economic thinkers identified
with dictated how they viewed the struggle between social classes. Jeremy
Bentham identified with the working class because he believed that social conflict
was a pressing issue in capitalist societies that could be fixed. Bentham was not a
member of the working class but he supported them because he argued that class
conflict could be resolved. This was based on his belief that private property was
a man-made institution (Hunt, 2002, 188). Ricardo identified with the capitalists
because he believed that class conflict was inherent in human nature; it was useless
to attempt to remedy it. Unlike Bentham, Ricardo argued that the institution of
private property was natural and eternal (Hunt, 2002, 122). Thus the main division
in classical political economy was how economists responded to the presence of
class conflict. Those who believed that private property was an ephemeral entity
believed class conflict could be solved by adopting a more socialistic economic
system. Ideology was a key determinant on how one responded to class conflicts
in capitalism. The split in classical political economy was thus rooted in the
differences in the treatment of class conflict. John Stuart Mill tried to do more
than simply unite two incompatible theories of value, he wanted to completely
alter the nature of capitalism. Mill wanted to show that social harmony could
exist within a capitalist society.
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Mill the Disciple
That Mill claimed to be a disciple of both Jeremy Bentham and David
Ricardo should come as no surprise. Mill’s father was close friends with both
Bentham and Ricardo, and was an overbearing presence in his son’s life. Bentham
clearly influenced the elder Mill beyond their personal relationship, as evidenced
by the Benthamite principles found in the elder Mill’s writing (Anderson, 2006,
12). James Mill also considered himself the “spiritual father” of Ricardo (Bowring,
1838-43, 10: 498 cited in Cremaschi, 2004, 378). It was James Mill who first
formed the potential link between utilitarianism and the labor theory of value that
his son would attempt to solidify. John Stuart Mill became indoctrinated in his
father’s ideas as the elder Mill groomed his son to carry on his work. John Stuart
embarked on a rigorous education plan at the behest of his father and by the time
he was a teenager, the younger Mill had become proficient in Latin, Greek, and
differential calculus. Initially, it appeared James Mill had successfully molded
his son to be his successor, to unite utilitarianism and the labor theory of value.
At first glance, Mill upheld his claim to be a disciple of Bentham. Mill
believed that pleasure and the avoidance of pain were the best possible outcomes
of an event (Mill, 2006 [1861], 68). Like his predecessor, this led Mill to
equate utility with the greatest happiness principle and underscore the equality
of all individual measurements of utility; societal utility depended on the equal
consideration of the utilities of the entire population (Mill, 2006 [1861], 111). Mill
thus paralleled Bentham on two fundamental points. The basic definition of utility
for both men rested on the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. Also of
critical significance was the importance placed on measuring individual utility.
Mill began his own analysis of utilitarianism from a Benthamite perspective.
Mill drew on his allegiance to Ricardo as he constructed his theory of
value. In his Principles of Political Economy, he argued something nearly identical
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to the labor theory of value; that the value of commodities was determined mainly by
quantity of labor required to produce it (Mill, 1884 [1848], 264). Mill also promoted
Say’s Law, which stated that a general glut of commodities was impossible. He
believed that whoever brought additional commodities to the market also brought
an additional increase in purchasing power, which was analogous to an increase in
demand (Mill, 1884 [1848], 366). And most importantly, Mill acknowledged the
critical exception inherent in the labor theory of value: it only held when the ratios
of capital to labor were equated across industries. Both men realized that any laborbased theory of value had to account for this issue. The influence of David Ricardo
was evident in the formation of Mill’s own theory of value.
Yet it soon became clear that John Stuart Mill did not completely agree
with Bentham’s utilitarianism and Ricardo’s labor theory of value. Free from his
father’s watchful eye after James’s death in 1832, John Stuart began to openly
criticize Bentham. He also found fault with the labor theory of value. Mill’s
Utilitarianism, published in 1861, and his Principles of Political Economy,
first published in 1848, were written in order to address what Mill deemed
shortcomings in the theories of Bentham and Ricardo. These attempts ultimately
proved unsuccessful. Despite his claim to be a disciple of Bentham and Ricardo,
Mill refuted both Benthamite utilitarianism and the labor theory of value.
Mill’s Great Endeavor
After James Mill’s death, John Stuart broke free from his father’s
doctrine. He published an essay in the London and Westminster Review in 1838
which criticized Bentham’s narrow view of human nature and underscored the
difficulty of applying the utility principle. Mill argued that happiness was too
complex to be sought directly, effectively discounting the utility principle except
as an “organizational discipline” (Hollander, 1985, 634). Benthamite utilitarianism
limited the emotions humans could experience, Mill claimed. Bentham was also
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faulted for depicting pleasure and pain as aloof masters of human action, giving
utilitarianism a cold nature. Mill’s separation from Ricardian thought was even
more pronounced. While Mill never renounced utilitarianism, his qualifications
of the labor theory of value led him to advocate an entirely different theory of
value. Mill considered it his duty as a disciple of both Bentham and Ricardo to
resolve the faults in their theories, but his conclusions bore little resemblance to
Benthamite and Ricardian thought.
Mill believed Bentham’s principle of utility was too simplistic. It was
not enough to determine happiness solely on the quantity of pleasures received;
the quality of pleasure also had to be taken into account. There existed pleasures
of such great quality that men would be unwilling to trade them for any quantity
of lesser pleasures, even if more pain was associated with the greater pleasure (Mill,
2006 [1861], 68). Yet people could not automatically determine the quality of a
pleasure, they had to cultivate and develop feelings in order to distinguish qualities
of pleasure. This stood in stark contradiction to Bentham’s belief that happiness
was determined solely by the quantity of pleasures. Mill furthermore contradicted
Bentham when he wrote that a person could act rationally without being happy
(Mill, 2006 [1861], 74). Mill believed that virtue, sacrificing one’s own happiness
to increase the happiness of others trumped individual happiness. Utilitarianism
was not entirely individualistic and in fact had a critical social component. The
final major difference in utilitarianism Mill espoused regarded felicific calculus.
If people calculated the consequences of every action they took, they would never
have enough time to actually carry them out (Mill, 2006 [1861], 81). Rather than
spending this time calculating to maximize their own happiness, people had to
promote the utility of society as a whole. Thus while Mill was a proponent of
utilitarianism, his utilitarianism was fundamentally different from Bentham’s in that
it was much more complex and founded on the idea of social utility.
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Principles revealed a much more drastic change in Mill than the one
seen in Utilitarianism. The divergence between Mill and Ricardo can be traced
to how each treated the caveat in the labor theory of value that it only held when
the ratio of capital to labor was equated across industries. Since Ricardo’s labor
theory of value consisted primarily of easily reproducible commodities, he largely
disregarded this stipulation. Although Mill accepted the labor theory of value,
he was strongly influenced by the improbability of the capital-to-labor ratio
qualification. He believed that the cost of production did determine the exchange
values for goods but this was not synonymous with Ricardo’s theory of value.
The cost of production included both the wages paid to the laborer and the
remuneration for the capitalists’ abstinence (Mill, 1884 [1848], 265). Value was
thus derived from other prices. There was no such thing as an invariable measure
of value under realistic conditions. This supposed improvement of Ricardo’s
labor theory of value was actually a regression back to an adding-up theory of
prices. Mill’s theory of value was more Smithian than Ricardian. There were also
numerous inconsistencies between Ricardo’s and Mill’s view on profits. While
Ricardo contended that there was a tendency for profits to fall as capital was
accumulated, Mill identified several counteracting tendencies which stabilized
the rate of profit. Factories became fixed capital and subsequently became sunk
costs (Mill, 1884 [1848], 504). If factories were sunk costs, they had no effect
on wages or profits. More efficient production enabled capital to be accumulated
without lowering the rate of profit (Mill, 1884 [1848], 505). Cheap commodities
from foreign countries would also boost the rate of profits (Mill, 1884 [1848],
506). Capitalists could pay their workers lower wages if food prices declined and
inexpensive raw materials would cut production costs. Mill’s interpretation of
value clashed with Ricardo’s despite his supposed discipleship.

85

Conclusion: Mill vs. Marx
John Stuart Mill considered himself a disciple of Ricardo because he
believed in the capitalist system. The socialist programs put forth by the likes of
Owen, Saint-Simon and Fourier were either impractical or undesirable (Schwartz,
1972, 191).

Mill identified himself as a Benthamite disciple because, like

Bentham, he also sought to end class conflict. Thus by combining utilitarianism
with the labor theory of value, Mill wanted to show that capitalism and social
harmony were not mutually exclusive. He approached the class conflict generated
by capitalism from a new perspective. It was more radical than merely writing
the subject off as a necessary part of capitalism but it was not so extreme that
it called for an entirely different economic system. Mill believed capitalism
was flawed, but he also thought he could fix it. It was impossible for him to
be a disciple of Bentham and Ricardo simultaneously because they were biased
from which classes they identified with. Mill wanted to reconcile the worker
and capitalist perspectives of capitalism to create a new form of capitalism. As a
result, his recommendations on policy reflected both Benthamite and Ricardian
influences. Bentham’s influence was most clearly seen in aspects of social policy.
Like Bentham, Mill believed that equality under the law was necessary for social
harmony (Mill, 2006 [1861], 99). If lower classes were made responsible for
their own lives and decisions, they would be more likely to improve their social
standing. But this increased responsibility meant that education needed to be
reformed so the poor could be more informed decision makers, another similarity
to Bentham. In regards to economic policy, Mill had more in common with
Ricardo. He advocated international trade on the basis of comparative advantage
(Mill, 1884 [1848], 380). Mill also wrote that the government should make no
distinction between classes (Mill, 1884 [1848], 539); the poor should not get
special treatment simply for being poor. Thus while Mill was against providing
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the poor with excessive economic relief, he promoted the idea of treating them as
social equals. Economic equality would grow from this social equality.
This stood in stark contrast to the view of capitalism espoused by
Mill’s peer, Karl Marx. Marx believed the workers would rise up against the
capitalists and introduce an era of socialism. “As long as there are capitalists and
workers, the workers will be exploited,” (Marx, 1963 [1848], 221) he proclaimed.
Social harmony could only be achieved when class divisions were abolished.
He advocated the abolishment of the Corn Laws because he believed it would
accelerate the process of a proletarian revolution. Marx thus took a critical,
pessimistic view of capitalism whereas Mill believed it could work. The schism
in classical political economy was not so much the divide between the utility and
labor theories of value as it was the opposing views on the future of capitalism,
in particular what needed to be done about class conflict. Mill tried to reconcile
these views but was ultimately unsuccessful. His proposed reform of capitalism
did not have a lasting impact. Severe class divisions still dominate capitalist
societies today. In the end, Mill was overshadowed in the annals of economic
thought because he was overly ambitious and took on an impossible task. John
Stuart Mill wanted to mend the image of capitalism.
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